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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the Korean-Japanese territorial dispute over the sovereignty 
of Dokdo/Takeshima. The Japanese government has argued that Dokdo/Takeshima is 
inherently Japanese territory.  But this thesis demonstrates the baselessness of this 
argument by exploring the two countries’ views of Dokdo/Takeshima’s status before and 
after the Russo-Japanese War and focuses in particular on Japan’s incorporation of 
Dokdo/Takeshima in 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War, an important episode in the 
contemporary dispute over the island’s status. 
Before the Russo-Japanese War, both Korea and Japan recognized 
Dokdo/Takeshima as Korean territory. In the course of the war, Japan attempted to offset 
Russian threats to Japan’s sea lanes by constructing observation posts along the Korean 
coastline. In doing so, Japanese officials incited a Japanese fisherman to petition to 
incorporate Dokdo/Takeshima into Japanese territory. In the end, Japan surreptitiously 
incorporated Dokdo/Takeshima into its territory and constructed an observation post on 
the island that was dismantled after the war. Nevertheless, Tokyo continued to recognize 
Dokdo/Takeshima as part of Korean territory even after its incorporation in 1905 and its 
formal annexation of Korea in 1910. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The territorial dispute over the Dokdo/Takeshima1 has been one of the most 
prominent obstacles to the establishment of good relations between Korea and Japan. The 
new millennium started with then Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro’s remark which 
claimed the Japanese sovereignty over Dokdo in 2000. In 2002, the Japanese Ministry of 
Education approved historical textbooks which promoted Japan’s title to Dokdo. In 2003, 
the issuing of a Korean stamp commemorating Dokdo troubled the Japanese people. In 
2004, the Japanese right-wing group, Nihon Shidokai, disturbed the Korean people when 
it announced its plan to land on Dokdo.  
The Japanese establishment of “Takeshima Day” in 2005, which was intended to 
celebrate its annexation of Dokdo in 1905, provoked large scale protests and anti-
Japanese demonstrations in Korea. In 2006, Japan’s attempt to send a survey ship to 
Dokdo highly intensified tensions between the two countries; Japan cancelled its plan 
after negotiating with a special envoy from South Korea. In May 2007, a supplementary 
textbook mentioning Dokdo as Japanese sovereign territory was approved by the 
Japanese Ministry of Education for use in Japanese schools. Even though the number of 
students who study with this book is low, the fact that it is in use increased the South 
Korean people’s level of antagonism toward Japan.  
In addition, historical distortions in some Japanese history textbooks, which 
glorify and justify Japanese activities before and after World War II, also have 
strengthened anti-Japanese sentiment in both China and Korea. The fact that both Japan 
and Korea claim sovereignty over Dokdo critically affects the relationship between the 
two countries. Military conflict over it, at the worst, is not the question if we do not 
carefully handle this problem. At any rate, it is clear that this issue will have a negative 
impact on the development of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.   
                                                 
1 Hereafter, the author uses the term Dokdo to refer to the island in order to avoid confusion. However, 
the terms “Takeshima,” “the Liancourt Rock,” or “Liancodo” are also used, based on their appearance in 
the referenced materials.  The name of the islands has been changed time after time, and different sources 
also use different names that reflect their perspective, in this case Korean or Japanese. 
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There are many territorial disputes between states that try to maximize their 
economic interests by acquiring areas rich in oils, natural gases, minerals, or fisheries. 
Dokdo appears to be one of these when one looks at the intensive tension between the 
two countries concerning the establishment of the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ), which involves the issues of fishery, mining undersea minerals, and 
exploiting resources in vicinity of Dokdo as well as Ulleungdo. 
However, this thesis argues that Dokdo is a historical issue rather a political one. 
It further argues that this issue has been politicized in both countries in spite of the fact 
that very few people know the historical facts, i.e., what happened with respect to 
Dokdo? This issue will not be resolved until both countries’ peoples understand the core 
of the problem. Therefore, this thesis seeks to recast the highly politicized issue into a 
rationally acceptable historical one, in the expectation that the truth about Dokdo will 
help overcome the emotional and political mobilization of both peoples. 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis explores the incorporation of Dokdo by Japan at the time of the 1904-
1905 Russo-Japanese War in order to trace the roots of the present territorial dispute. 
Assessing the historical facts will help answer the following questions: 
• Which country had sovereignty over Dokdo before the Russo-Japanese 
War? 
• What is the relationship between the war and Dokdo? 
• When did Japan incorporate Dokdo? 
• What was the process of incorporation by Japan? 
• Why did Japan incorporate Dokdo? 
• How did the Japanese treat Dokdo after Japan’s formal annexation of 
Korea? 
• Finally, what are the implications of the answers to the aforementioned 
questions? 
 3
B. GEOGRAPHY OF DOKDO 
Dokdo consists of two small rocky islands, called Dongdo (East Island) and 
Seodo (West Island) in Korean, and 89 small islets. It is located in the East Sea/Sea of 
Japan at 131˚51´22˝ east longitude and 37˚14´18˝ north latitude. Dokdo is located 217 
kilometers (117 nautical miles) east of Chukpyon on the central South Korean mainland, 
and 87 kilometers (47 nautical miles) southeast of Ulleungdo.2 Dokdo is about 200 
kilometers (108 nautical miles) north of the main Japanese island of Honshu, and about 
158 kilometers (85 nautical miles) northwest of the Japanese island of Oki.3 Dokdo can 
be seen from Ulleungdo on a clear day, while it cannot be seen from Oki Island, the 
closest Japanese territory. The island group has a total land area of 23 hectares (186,121 
square meters).4 Only three Korean civilians live on the islands.  Dokdo has been guarded 
by the Korean maritime police, who have been stationed at Dongdo (East Island) since 
1954. 
 
Figure 1.   The Geography of Dokdo/Takeshima5 
                                                 
2 Ulleungdo is called “Matsushima” in Japanese, and is known as “Dagelet” to Westerners. 
3 Alan J. Day, ed., Border and Territorial Disputes (New York: Longman, 1987), 337. 
4 The group was measured by the Korean Alpine Society survey team in November 1952; the whole 
area is equivalent to 400 square meters. Hideki Kajimura, “The Question of Takeshima/Tokdo,” Korea 
Observer 28, no. 3 (1997), 433. 
5 Dokdo in Korea, www.dokdo.go.kr (accessed December 13, 2007). 
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C. HISTORY OF THE DISPUTE AFTER WORLD WAR II 
The dispute over Dokdo emerged with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which was 
signed on September 8, 1951. At first, the Allied Powers’ policy concerning the 
sovereignty of Dokdo was clear: Japan had to relinquish its sovereignty over Dokdo. The 
first five drafts of the Treaty required that Dokdo be returned to Korea.6 For example, the 
November 2, 1949 draft (Chapter II, Territorial Clauses, Article 6) states that: 
Japan hereby renounces in favor of Korea all rights and titles to the 
Korean mainland territory and all offshore Korean islands, including 
Quelpart (Shaishu To), the Nan How group (San To or Komun Do) which 
forms Port Hamilton (Tonankai), Dagelet island (Utsuryo To, or Matsu 
Shima), Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima), and all other islands and islets to 
which Japan has acquired title lying outside the line described in Article 3 
and to the east of the meridian 124˚ 15’E. longitude, north of the parallel 
33˚ N. latitude, and west of a line from the seaward terminus of the 
boundary approximately three nautical miles from the mouth of the Tumen 
River to a point in 37˚ 30’ N. latitude, 132˚ 40’ E. longitude.7  
But one month later, the sixth draft of December 1949 included Dokdo as 
Japanese territory. Kimie Hara gives two reasons for this change. 8  First, a commentary 
on the fifth draft from William J. Sebald, political advisor to the Supreme Commander, 
Allied Powers in Japan, to the State Department might have influenced this change. 
Sebald’s commentary stated, “Recommend reconsideration Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima). 
Japan’s claim to these islands is old and appears valid. Security considerations might 
conceivably envisage weather and radar stations there.”9 Second, strategic considerations 
might have influenced the change.10 According to Hara, 
 
                                                 
6 Kimie Hara, “50 Years from San Francisco: Re-Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan’s Territorial 
Problems,” Pacific Affairs 74, no. 3 (2001): 369. 
7 National Archives, Files of the Department of State, Office of Northeast Asia Affairs, Records 
Related to the Treaty of Peace with Japan-Subject File, 1945-41, Box 6,  NND913302, RG59, Lot 56D527, 
Box 1, as cited in Hara, 369. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Hara, “50 Years from San Francisco,” 368-369. 
10 Ibid., 370. 
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This was in late 1949, in the midst of escalation of the cold war, when 
communism was expanding internationally and had just taken power in 
China. Japan therefore came to be viewed as the country of primary 
importance for U.S. strategy in Asia, whereas Korea, whose future 
appeared unclear, was accorded only secondary importance. If the 
communists of the North came to dominate the whole of Korea, it was 
preferable for those islands (Takeshima) in the Sea of Japan not to be 
Korean territory.11 
Consequently, the Allied Powers’ policy toward Dokdo lost consistency. The 
sixth, eighth, ninth, and fourteenth drafts listed Dokdo as Japanese territory, while the 
seventh, tenth through thirteenth, and fifteenth through eighteenth drafts and the final 
draft did not clearly mention the status of Dokdo. In the end, the peace treaty’s Article 2 
(a) sowed the seeds of the dispute between Korea and Japan by leaving Dokdo out 
entirely, stating only that “Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all 
right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and 
Dagelet.”12 
In July 1951, the then-South Korean ambassador to the United States, You Chan 
Yang, sent a letter to then-Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson requesting that “Dokdo” 
and “Parangdo” be listed into the treaty as territories that Japan should renounce.13 
However, Acheson denied the Korean ambassador’s request.14 In January 1952, three 
months before the peace treaty came into force, the then-South Korean president 
Syngman Rhee proclaimed Korean jurisdiction over waters ranging from 60 nautical 
miles up to 170 miles from the Korean coast. The so-called “Syngman Rhee Line” or 
“peace line,” included Dokdo within its boundaries. 15  Since then, the dispute has 
persisted for more than five decades. 
                                                 
11 Hara, “50 Years from San Francisco, 371. 
12 Here, those islands were internationally recognized by the Western countries at that time; Quelpart 
is currently Jejudo, Port Hamilton is Geomundo, and Dagelet is Ulleungdo, in the Republic of Korea. 
13 This document can be found at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/takeshima/pdfs/g_sfjoyaku02.pdf 
(accessed August 15, 2007). 
14 This document can be found at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/takeshima/pdfs/g_sfjoyaku03.pdf 
(accessed August 15, 2007). 
15 Day, Border and Territorial Disputes, 337. 
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While there are many books and articles related to this issue written both in 
Korean and Japanese, there are only a few articles and books concerning this issue in 
English. However, because this writer does not read Japanese, the variety of resources for 
this research have been limited to original sources written in Korean, Japanese scholars’ 
works translated into Korean, some works translated from Japanese into English, and a 
few articles written in English. Nevertheless, the sources available in Korean or English 
should make it possible to examine the argument and critiques of both countries. 
Drawing a line among the approaches to the Dokdo issue is relatively simple. The 
differences fall into three categories. The first concerns the 1951 San Francisco Peace 
Treaty, the second concerns the relevance of the historical record dating back to antiquity, 
and the third concerns the validity and legality of the Japanese incorporation of Dokdo in 
1905. According to the literature, each country’s argument is almost the same.  
In order to comprehend the differences between the two approaches as well as the 
two countries, a review of the current Japanese government’s position toward the Dokdo 
issue is a good place to begin.16 
• In the light of historical facts and based upon international law, it is 
apparent that Takeshima is an inherent part of the territory of Japan. 
• The occupation of Takeshima by the Republic of Korea is an illegal 
occupation undertaken on absolutely no basis in international law. Any 
measures taken with regard to Takeshima by the Republic of Korea based 
on such an illegal occupation have no legal justification. (Note: The 





                                                 
16 The main argument of the first school of thought, which upholds the Japanese government’s 
position, is well summarized in Benjamin K. Sibbett, “Tokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute 
between Japan and the Republic of Korea,” Fordham International Law Journal 21 (1998): 1606-1646. 
Another good summary is presented by Byung-Ryull Kim, Dokdo-e daehan ilbonsarmadul’ui Jujang (The 
Japanese Arguments on Dokdo) (Seoul: Dadamedia, 2001). The main arguments of the Japanese scholars, 
and criticisms of these arguments are well summarized in Kim, Dokdo Non-Jaeng (A Debate on Dokdo) 
(Seoul: Dadamedia, 2005), 108-224. A debate between famous Japanese scholar Simozo Masao and two 
Korean scholars, Byung-Ryull Kim and Chang-Kwon Kwak, shows the main points of arguments between 
the two schools of thought and the two countries. Kim, A Debate on Dokdo, 283-433. 
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prior to Japan's effective control over Takeshima and establishment of 
sovereignty, the Republic of Korea had previously demonstrated effective 
control over Takeshima).17 
1. The First Debate: Interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
The first debate is over the interpretation of the San Francisco Peace Treaty 
signed in September 1951. While a first school of thought maintains that Dokdo was 
returned to Japan,18 a second school of thought complains that Dokdo was not returned to 
Japan.19 The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter, MOFA), based on the first 
school of thought, states that: 
(1) The San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed in September 1951, stipulated 
that Japan should recognize the independence of Korea, and that Japan 
should renounce all right, title and claim to “Korea, including the islands 
of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.”  
(2) Upon learning of this section drafted by the United States and United 
Kingdom, in July 1951, the ROK submitted a letter to Dean G. Acheson, 
the Secretary of State of the United States, from You Chan Yang, Korean 
Ambassador to the United States. This letter contained, “My Government 
requests that the word “renounces” in Paragraph a, Article Number 2, 
should be replaced by “confirms that it renounced on August 9, 1945, all 
                                                 
17 Japan, MOFA, The Issue of Takeshima, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/takeshima/index.html (accessed May 28, 2007). Most recently, in April-May 2007, the Japanese 
MOFA remodeled its internet homepage, strengthening and defending its previous arguments after being 
criticized by several scholars. This quotation is from the revised Japanese MOFA’s argument. The old 
argument reads:  Based on historical facts and international law, it is apparent that Takeshima is an integral 
part of Japan's sovereign territory.  The occupation of Takeshima by the Republic of Korea is an illegal 
occupation undertaken with absolutely no basis whatsoever in international law. Any measures taken with 
regard to Takeshima by the Republic of Korea based on such an illegal occupation have no legal 
justification. (Note: The Republic of Korea has yet to demonstrate a clear basis for its claims that, prior to 
Japan's effective rule over Takeshima and establishment of sovereignty, the Republic of Korea had 
previously demonstrated effective rule over Takeshima). 
18 Kawakami Kenzo (天上健三), A Historical and Geographical Study on Takeshima (Takeshima no 
rekishi chirigakuteki kenkyu, 竹島の歷史地理學的硏究) (Tokyo: Kinkoshoten (古今書院), 1966), 252-
256; 植田捷雄, “竹島の歸屬をめぐる日韓紛爭,”一橋論業, 54 卷 1 號 (1965), 23-24; 皆川洸, “竹島紛
爭と國際判例,” 前原光雄敎授還歷記念, 國際法學の諸問題 (東京: 慶應通信, 1963), 368-369; 高野雄
一, 日本の領土 (東京: 東京大學出版部, 1962), 69, quoted in Kim, The Japanese Arguments on Dokdo. 
19 Young Koo Kim, A Pursuit of Truth in the Dokdo Island Issue: Letters to a Young Japanese Man 
(Seoul: Bubyoungsa, 2003); Yong-Ha Shin, Hankook-gwa Ilbon-ui Dokdo Youngyookwon NonJaeng (The 
Korean-Japanese Dispute over the Sovereignty of Dokdo) (Seoul: Hanyang University Press, 2003), 203-
241; Shin, Dokdo-ui Minjok Youngto-sa Yeon’gu (A Territorial and Historical Study on Dokdo) (Seoul: 
Jisik Sanupsa, 1996), 241-322; Byung-Ryull Kim and Naito Seichu, Hanil Jeunmoon-ga-ga Bon Dokdo 
(The Korean-Japanese Experts’ View on Dokdo) (Seoul: Dadamedia, 2006), 119-131, 275-293. 
 8
right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of Korea 
prior to its annexation by Japan, including the islands Quelpart, Port 
Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo.”  
(3) In August of the same year, the U.S. responded to the above-
mentioned request, with a letter from Dean Rusk, United States Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs to Ambassador Yang. The 
content of the response was, “...the United States Government does not 
feel that the Treaty (San Francisco Peace Treaty) should adopt the theory 
that Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration on August 9, 1945 
constituted a formal or final renunciation of sovereignty by Japan over the 
areas dealt with in the Declaration. As regards the island of Dokdo, 
otherwise known as Takeshima or Liancourt Rocks, this normally 
uninhabited rock formation was according to our information never treated 
as part of Korea and, since about 1905, has been under the jurisdiction of 
the Oki Islands Branch Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan. The island 
does not appear ever before to have been claimed by Korea.”  
Based on this correspondence, it is evident that Takeshima has been 
affirmed as part of the territory of Japan.20 
When the United States denied the South Korean government’s request to include 
Dokdo in the treaty as Korean territory, it seems that the United States was in favor of the 
Japanese side. However, considering that Japan had made every effort to retain its rights 
over several territories, which the Imperial Japan had acquired before and during the 
                                                 
20 Japan, MOFA, The Issue of Takeshima, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/takeshima/position.html (accessed May 28, 2007). The old argument reads: In all of the documents 
regarding the series of measures taken prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of the Peace with Japan 
(Directive SCAPIN-677 issued by the General Headquarters Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
on January 29, 1946, provides for an interim cessation by Japan of the exercise or attempt to exercise 
governmental or administrative authority over Takeshima, and Directive SCAPIN-1033 of June 22, 1946, 
places Takeshima outside the area delineated by the MacArthur Line, which established areas in which 
Japanese fishing, whaling and similar operations were authorized), it is made clear that the documents do 
not represent final decisions concerning the attribution of Japanese sovereign territory, and it is also clear 
that Takeshima is not excluded from Japanese territory. The statement issued following the Cairo 
Conference in 1943 stipulating that, "Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has 
taken by violence and greed," in particular the reference to "territories which she has taken by violence and 
greed" in no way applies to Takeshima, which is an integral part of Japan's sovereign territory. 
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Second World War, including Dokdo,21 and the Japanese had had formidable influence 
on the drafting process,22 a more correct conclusion might be that the Allied powers, at 
the least, did not intend to state their position over the sovereignty of Dokdo, choosing 
instead to “remain silent on the issue, thus leaving the issue open for further 
deliberation.”23  
2. The Second Debate: Historical Facts 
Among the three debates, the most complicated and controversial is related to the 
interpretation of historical facts. The Japanese MOFA and its supporting school of 
thought maintain its position with a consensus on the overview of the “Sovereignty of 
Takeshima.” 
The knowledge of Japanese people on Takeshima is closely linked with 
the history of the development of Utsuryo (Ulleungdo) Island. From the 
first half of the 17th century, merchants of the feudal clan of Tottori were 
granted permission for passage to Utsuryo Island by the Shogunate, where 







                                                 
21 For instance, Yoshida Shigeru, then the Japanese Prime Minister, stated in his Memoirs that: The 
Japanese government submitted materials to the U.S. so abundant for them as to speak for Japan in the 
course of negotiating the Peace Treaty. Particularly, we concentrated our utmost efforts in preparing the 
materials for the territorial clause of the draft treaty. We stressed and gave a full explanation that those 
outlaying islands, such as Okinawa, Bonin, Kuril, and Sakhalin islands have the indivisible relationships 
with Japan in respects of history, geography, race and economy. The collected materials submitted to the 
U.S. had piled up to 7 volumes only in relation with the territorial clause.  Yoshida Shigeru, Memoirs of the 
Ten Years, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Shinchosa, 1957), quoted in Kim, A Pursuit of Truth in the Dokdo Island Issue, 
67. 
22 Mr. Shimoda Takezo, the then-Under-secretary, the Treaty Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, 
who was closely involved in the drafting process, recollected in his memoir that:  The SCAP, being 
conscious of the other allied powers like the USSR, had initially refused to receive such reports made by 
the enemy, Japan, until 1946. As the U.S.-USSR confrontation formulating the post cold-war situation had 
become intensified, however, Washington had come to realize the real value of those Japanese reports and 
begun to receive them willingly.  Shimoda Takezo, The Post Japanese Diplomacy: A Memoir (Tokyo: 
Centre for the Study of Administration, 1984), quoted in Kim, A Pursuit of Truth in the Dokdo Island Issue, 
67. 
23 Jon M. Van Dyke, “Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary,” 
Ocean Development and International Law 38, nos. 1 & 2 (2007): 184. 
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permission. From that time onwards Takeshima became a stopping-off 
port for passage to Utsuryo Island, and fishing activities started around 
Takeshima.24 
Some different interpretations of historical records exist even within the same 
school of thought. Nevertheless, generally speaking, the first school of thought and the 
Japanese government maintain that Dokdo is Japanese territory on the basis of its 
interpretation of the historical facts.25 In contrast, the second school of thought supports 
the Korean government’s position.26 Most recently, Jon Van Dyke made a thorough 
study of the Dokdo issue, from the old history of both countries to the recent debate.27 As 
an answer to the historical problem, he concludes that:  
Korea’s claim to sovereignty over Dokdo is thus substantially stronger 
than that of Japan, based on the historical evidence of Korea’s exercise of 
sovereignty during previous centuries and the recognition of Korea’s 
claim by Japanese cartographers and government officials during the 
eighteen and nineteenth centuries…..28 
3. The Third Debate: Validity of the Incorporation of Dokdo by Japan 
The third debate concerns whether the Japanese incorporation of Dokdo in 1905 
was valid or not. The Japanese MOFA and its supporting school of thought maintain that: 
                                                 
24 Japan, MOFA, The Issue of Takeshima, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/takeshima/sovereignty.html (accessed May 28, 2007). The old argument reads: In light of the 
following historical facts, it is apparent that at the latest by the middle of the 17th century, Japan had 
established sovereignty of Takeshima based on effective rule. After 1905 too, Japan's claim to sovereignty 
of Takeshima was reaffirmed as a modern nation state, based on a Cabinet decision, and in this way 
Takeshima has effectively been ruled by Japan. 
25 Kawakami Kenzo, A Historical and Geographical Study on Takeshima, quoted in Kim, The 
Japanese Arguments on Dokdo. 
26 Kim, A Debate on Dokdo, 76-105; Kim and Seichu, The Korean-Japanese Experts’ View on Dokdo, 
3-58, 163-247; Yong-Ha Shin, Hankook-gwa Ilbon-ui Dokdo Youngyookwon NonJaeng (The Korean 
Japanese Dispute on the Sovereignty of Dokdo) (Seoul: Hanyang University Press, 2003), 109-165, 197-
201; Yong-Ha Shin, Dokdo-ui Minjok Youngto-sa Yeon’gu (A Historical Study on the Sovereignty of 
Dokdo) (Seoul: Jisik Sanupsa, 1996), 55-203; Seichu, “Is Takeshima (竹島) Japanese Indigenous 
Territory?,” in A Fresh Look at the Dokdo Issue: Japanese Scholars Review Historical Facts, trans. M. 
Marek and S.J. Choi  (Seoul: Dadamedia, 2006): 19-52; Seichu, “An Introduction to Pre-modern Historical 
Studies on Takeshima,” in A Fresh Look at the Dokdo Issue,  53-98; Seichu, “Ahn Yong-Bok in Oki 
(隱岐),” in A Fresh Look at the Dokdo Issue, 99-134.  
27 Van Dyke, “Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary.” 
28 Ibid., 195-196. 
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Based on the Cabinet Decision and the Ministerial Instruction from the 
Minister for Home Affairs, the Governor of Shimane Prefecture published 
in February 1905 that Takeshima was officially named as “Takeshima” 
and that it came under the jurisdiction of the Okinoshima branch. He also 
informed the Okinoshima branch to this effect. These measures were 
carried in the newspapers of the day and were broadly publicized.29 
The first school of thought maintains that the Japanese incorporation of Dokdo 
met the standard of international law, and, by this, Japan also “reaffirmed” its sovereignty 
over Dokdo.30 In contrast, the second school of thought criticizes this position on the 
basis that the Japanese government took Dokdo from Korea during the Russo-Japanese 
War to use this island for military purposes, despite its recognition that Dokdo was 
Korean territory. 31  Professor Naito Seichu argues that the Japanese government’s 
argument is paradoxical, because, if Dokdo was terra nullius,32 the Japanese government 
could not claim that Takeshima was its inherent territory.33 Benjamin K. Sibbett, after 
studying several similar territorial disputes worldwide and evaluating Japan’s and 
Korea’s positions in the context of the Japanese government’s “occupation”34 of Dokdo 
in 1905, also concludes that: 
                                                 
29 Japan, MOFA, The Issue of Takeshima, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/takeshima/incorporation.html (accessed May 28, 2007). The old argument reads: The measures to 
incorporate Takeshima into Shimane Prefecture in 1905, through the Cabinet decision and notification by 
Shimane prefecture reaffirmed the intention of the Japanese government to claim territorial rights as a 
modern nation over Takeshima. There were no indications that Japan did not hold territorial rights prior to 
that, nor were there any counter claims by any other country of territorial rights over Takeshima. In 
addition, the incorporation of Takeshima was reported in the newspapers and was not undertaken secretly, 
hence it can be seen to have been implemented validly. (Note: It is not an obligation under international law 
to notify foreign governments of measures to incorporate territory). 
30 Kawakami Kenzo, A Historical and Geographical Study on Takeshima. 
31 Kim and Seichu, The Korean-Japanese Experts’ View on Dokdo, 59-118, 249-293; Kim, Ilbon 
Gunbuui Dokdo ChimTalsa (The Plunder of Dokdo by the Japanese Military) (Seoul: Dadamedia, 2006); 
Matsumoto Takeo (松本健男), “How to Achieve a Fair Solution to the Senkaku Islands and Takeshima 
Problems: Recognizing the Need to View the Issue as a Result of Policies of Aggression,” in  A Fresh Look 
at the Dokdo Issue, 1-17; Shin, The Korean Japanese Dispute on the Sovereignty of Dokdo, 167-196; Shin, 
A Territorial and Historical Study on Dokdo, 203-240. 
32 Terra nullius or territorium nullius is uninhabited or inhabited territory that does not belong to any 
state, Benjamin K. Sibbett, “Tokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute between Japan and the Republic 
of Korea:” 1624. 
33 Kim and Seichu, The Korean-Japanese Experts’ View on Dokdo, 250. 
34 “Occupation” is a state’s intentional appropriation of sovereignty over territory treated as a terra 
nullius. Sibbett, “Tokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute between Japan and the Republic of Korea:” 
1624. 
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Any Japanese claim to sovereignty based on occupation will be fraught 
with difficulty because occupation presumes that the occupied territory 
does not already belong to a state. Liancourt’s history defies this 
presumption because it appears to have initially belonged to Korea. 
Indeed, Japan’s assertion of sovereignty, based on a series of agreements 
with Korea prior to and including the 1910 Annexation Agreement, 
negates any discovery-based ownership claims Japan might have because 
it concedes a lack of initial ownership.35  
E. SCOPE OF THESIS AND ARGUMENTS 
Among the aforementioned disputes, it is the last dispute concerning the 
incorporation of Dokdo by Japan in 1905 that this thesis will explore. As was discussed 
earlier, the Allied powers seemed to have wanted the question of the sovereignty of 
Dokdo to remain open. Most scholars acknowledge that Korea has the stronger claim in 
terms of history. Thus, one question remains: the validity of the incorporation of Dokdo 
by Japan. The Japanese claim has two controversial arguments, as noted by Naito Seichu. 
First, did Japan recognize Dokdo as its sovereign territory? Second, was Dokdo terra 
nullius before Japan formally incorporated it? To find appropriate answers, this thesis 
will explore Japan’s recognition and treatment of Dokdo before, during, and after the 
Russo-Japanese War.  
Based on the research, this thesis will argue that: 
• Japan recognized Dokdo as Korean territory before and during the Russo-
Japanese War. 
• Japan incorporated Dokdo to use it for a military purpose during the war.  
• Japan recognized Dokdo as part of Korean territory even after it annexed 
Korea.  
F. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis explores Japan’s actions to incorporate Dokdo before and after the 
Russo-Japanese War in order to uncover the historical facts. Also explored are Japan’s 
                                                 
35“Occupation” is a state’s intentional appropriation of sovereignty over territory treated as a terra 
nullius. Sibbett, “Tokdo or Takeshima? The Territorial Dispute between Japan and the Republic of Korea:” 
1624. 
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recognition and treatment of Dokdo before and after the war to evaluate whether Dokdo 
was inherently a Japanese territory, whether the incorporation of Dokdo was undertaken 
with good reasons and by fair means, and, ultimately, whether the current Japanese 
government has a right to claim sovereignty over Dokdo.  
Due to the limited literature written in English on the subject, especially regarding 
the relationship between the Russo-Japanese War and the incorporation of Dokdo by 
Japan, the majority of sources consist of professional and scholarly literature published in 
Korean, as well as the work of Japanese scholars that has been translated into Korean or 
English. However, by including the primary sources referred in the secondary sources, a 
balanced analysis will be conducted. 
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II. DOKDO BEFORE THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 
A. KOREAN RECOGNITION OF DOKDO  
1. Korean Documents from before the War 
The oldest Korean historical record related to Dokdo appears in AD 512, when 
Silla, one of the old Korean kingdoms in the Three Kingdom period, subjugated the 
Kingdom of Usanguk (an old Kingdom that was based on Ulleungdo).36  The Korean 
people referred to Dokdo by a number of different names over time, including Usando, 
Jasando, and Sambongdo.37 However, the recognition of and execution of sovereign 
rights over Dokdo by the Korean people was maintained continuously. 
From 1416 until 1881, Korea maintained a “vacant island policy,” which banned 
Koreans from living on islands that were remote from the Korean mainland.38 This policy 
was intended to protect Koreans from attacks by Japanese pirates, as well as to prevent 
them from avoiding taxes or military service.39 However, historical records show that 
Korea exercised continuous administrative control over Ulleungdo and Dokdo. For 
instance, according to The Annals of King Sejong, in 1425 King Sejong appointed a 
                                                 
36 Kim Bu-Sik, History of the Three Kingdoms (Samguk Sagi), vol .4, Section on “King Jijeung,” 
compiled in 1145 under the order of King Injong (1122-1146), as cited in Shin, Korea’s Territorial Rights 
to Tokdo: A Historical Study (Seoul: Tokdo Research Association, 1997), 25-28. The status of Dokdo was 
not clearly mentioned in History of the Three Kingdoms, but Korean scholars maintain that Usanguk must 
have governed both Ulleungdo and Dokdo, given that these islands are in the same vicinity and can be seen 
from each other. Professor Yong-Ha Shin states that “There is no doubt that a sea route was much more 
convenient in ancient times than a land route, and when a terra firma was occupied its adjacent islands were 
generally included in it.” Shin, Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokdo, 28. 
37 Several names are recorded referring to Dokdo in Korean history, but it seems Dokdo was referred 
to as “Usando” from the 1400s until the late 1800s, when Korea renamed it “Dokdo.” Shin, Korea’s 
Territorial Rights to Tokdo, 56. 
38 The Annals of King Taejong (Taejong Silnok), vol. 33, entry for January, 17th year of King Taejong, 
in Dongbuga ui P`yonghwa rul wihan Parun Yoksa Chongnip Kihoektan (hereafter Parun Yoksa 
Kihoektan), Dokdo Jaryojip (Dokdo Data) 1 (Seoul: Dadamedia, 2005), 98-104. 
39 Shin, Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokdo, 47-48. 
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Commissioner of Pacification for Usan (current Dokdo), Murung (current Ulleungdo) 
and other islands 40 and directed him to check the implementation of the policy.41  
The Gazetteer of the Annals of King Sejong (Sejong Silnok Jiriji) describes 
Ulleungdo and Dokdo as follows: “Two islands of Usan (current Dokdo) and Murung 
(current Ulleungdo) are located on the sea due east of this County (Uljin County). These 
islands are not so far from each other and are faintly visible on a clear day. They were 
called Usanguk during the period of Silla.”42  
In June 1614, an envoy from Tsushima came to Korea to ask for help in surveying 
Ulleungdo. Korea denied the Japanese request on the basis that Ulleungdo was Korean 
territory, though the island was vacant in accordance with the “vacant island policy.”43 
In 1693, the Choson dynasty had a territorial dispute with Japan. The dispute is 
called the “Ahn Yong-Bok Incident” in Korean and “Takeshima (current Ulleungdo, not 
Dokdo) 44  affair” in Japanese. The dispute began as a conflict between Korean and 
Japanese fishermen concerning fishing rights off the shores of Ulleungdo and Dokdo. 
Following negotiations between the two countries, Japan acknowledged Ulleungdo as 
Korean territory and prohibited its fishermen from sailing to the island – a policy that it 
kept until the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The Japanese government’s decision “appeared 
to recognize that Dokdo was an appendage linked to Ulleungdo and subject to the same 
regime.”45 However, the present Japanese government maintains that: 
. . . in 1692 when the members of the Murakawa traveled to the island, and 
again in 1693 when the members of the Ohya traveled there, they 
encountered many Koreans who were engaged in fishing around the 
                                                 
40 The Annals of King Sejong (Sejong Silnok), vol. 29, entry for August, 8 year of King Sejong, in 
Parun Yoksa Kihoektan, Dokdo Data 1, 113- 116. 
41 Ibid., 117-121. 
42 The Annals of King Sejong (Sejong Silnok), vol. 153, entry for Uljin County, Kangwon Province, in 
Yoksa Chongnip Kihoektan, Dokdo Data 1, 195-202. This record is one of the important records which 
show that Korea considered itself sovereign over Ulleungdo and Dokdo for centuries.  
43 Byung-Ryull Kim, Dokdo Jaryo Chongnam (A Comprehensive Bibliography of Dokdo) (Seoul: 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, 1997), 159-162.  
44 Until the late 19th century, the Japanese referred to Ulleungdo as Takeshima and Dokdo as 
Matushima. 
45 Van Dyke, “Legal Issues Related to Sovereignty over Dokdo and Its Maritime Boundary,” 166. 
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island. This prompted the initiation of negotiations between the 
governments of Japan and Korea concerning the sovereignty of Utsuryo 
Island. Ultimately, in January 1696, the Shogunate issued a ban on the 
passage of ships to Utsuryo Island (the so-called “Takeshima Ikken (The 
Affair of Takeshima). However, there was no prohibition placed on travel 
to Takeshima.46 
The Japanese government accepts that Dokdo was used as a navigational check 
point when Japanese fishermen sailed to Ulleungdo for fishing. However, given the 
Japanese prohibition on traveling to Ulleungdo, it is questionable whether the Japanese 
needed that check point. In this regard, a more reasonable interpretation might be that, 
when the Tokukawa shogunate renounced its claim over Ulleungdo and banned sailing to 
the island, it also renounced the same claim over Dokdo, since the island was merely a 
check point for navigating to Ulleungdo.  
After opening its door to Japan in 1876, Korea gradually came under Japan’s 
influence. Even though the Meiji Government still adhered to the ban on sailing to 
Ulleungdo, illegal Japanese fishing in the vicinity of Ulleungdo and Dokdo and 
lumbering on Ulleungdo became a problem for Korea. Therefore, Korea strongly 
protested to Japan, demanding that it “prohibit Japanese voyages to Ulleungdo.”47 While 
delaying its reply to Korea, Japan carried out research concerning the status of Dokdo 
and concluded that the island was Korean territory.48 In 1881, Japan acknowledged that 
its people had been illegally voyaging to Ulleungdo and exploiting its resources, and 
promised that they would withdraw from the island.  However, this promise was not fully 
kept. 49  Finally, Korea abolished the “vacant island policy” and, in 1883, started 
developing Ulleungdo by moving Koreans there from the mainland.50  
                                                 
46 Japan, MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/position.html (accessed October 1, 
2007). 
47 Shin, Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokdo, 107. 
48 Kitazawa Shosei carried out the research and submitted his results in July 1881, in a report entitled 
A Research on the Ownership of Takeshima. Cited in Shin, Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokdo, 107-108. 
49 Ibid., 107-108. 
50 Ibid., 108-117.  
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In 1897, King Kojong changed the name of his dynasty from the Choson Dynasty 
to the Korean Empire (Daehan Jeguk). In the face of ever-increasing Japanese influence 
over Korea and illegal activities on Ulleungdo, Emperor Kojong decided to confirm the 
ownership of both Ulleungdo and Dokdo. On October 25, 1900, Emperor Kojong 
promulgated Imperial Ordinance No. 41, entitled “On the Re-designation of Ulleungdo as 
Uldo County and the Change of the Title of the Island Superintendent to County 
Magistrate.”51 This Ordinance reads: 
Article 1 
Ulleungdo shall be re-designated Uldo country and placed under Kangwon 
province; the title of Island Superintendent shall be changed to County 
Magistrate; it shall be incorporated into the administrative system and the 
county shall be of grade five. 
Article 2 
The county office shall be located at Taehadong; the county shall have 
under jurisdiction the whole island of Ulleungdo, Chukdo and Sokdo 
(Dokdo) . . . 52 
By this, Korea upgraded the status of Ulleungdo and placed Dokdo (referred to as 
“Sokdo”) under its jurisdiction. After two days, on October 27, 1900, Korea officially 
announced this fact on the official gazette of the Korean Empire.  
2. Korean Maps from before the War 
A Map of Kangwon Province (Kangwon Jido) from 1481 and A Complete Map of 
Eight Provinces of Korea (Paldo Chongdo) from 1531, which was included in the 
Revised and Augmented Version of the Survey of National Geography of Korea (Sinjeung 
Dongguk Yeoji Seungnam), described Ulleungdo and Dokdo, though their position is 
incorrect. Between the 17th and mid-18th century, several Korean maps showed the same 
                                                 




error, but they clearly described two different islands in the East Sea/Sea of Japan.53 
Since the late 18th century, the position of Dokdo and Ulleungdo became settled as the 
Korean people’s understanding of geography grew.54 In the 19th century, Korean maps 
became more detailed and correct.55 For instance, A Complete Map of Korea (Tongguk 
Jundo) from the early 19th century and A Map of Korea (Haejwa Jundo) from the late 19th 
century clearly show Usando (Dokdo) as Korean territory. 
B. THE JAPANESE RECOGNITION OF DOKDO 
1. Japanese Documents from before the War 
When Korea maintained its “vacant island policy” from 1416 to 1881, Japan 
recognized Ulleungdo and Dokdo as Korean territory. For instance, in 1620, the 
Tokugawa Bakufu executed some Japanese people who were smuggling into Ulleungdo.  
The oldest Japanese governmental record related to Ulleungdo and Dokdo is an 
observational trip report to Oki Island (隱州視聽合記) in 1667. This report was the first 
and most important historical record presented by the Japanese government when the 
territorial argument first started in the 1950s. However, this report was not helpful to the 
Japanese; instead, it weakened the Japanese position. This report stated that the “two 
islands (Takeshima and Matsushima) are uninhabited and getting a sight of Koryo 
(Korea) from there is like viewing Oki from Onshu. Thus, marks the northwestern 
boundary of Japan.”56  
After the “Takeshima affair,” Japan adhered to its ban on sailing to the island and 
this policy continued until the late 1800s. After the Meiji Restoration, Japan grew into a 
new imperialistic power in Asia. The main victim of Japanese imperialistic expansion  
 
                                                 
53 Sang-Tae Lee, Historical Evidence of Korean Sovereign over Dokdo (Seoul: Kyongsaewon, 2007), 
19-37.  
54 Ibid., 36-48. 
55 Ibid., 49-59. 
56 Kim, A Comprehensive Bibliography of Dokdo, 260-261. 
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was Korea. However, the Meiji government clearly recognized Dokdo as Korean territory. 
A good example of this can be seen in “A Confidential Inquiry into the Particulars of 
Foreign Relations of Korea,” published in 1870.57 
In 1869, a group of Meiji Foreign Ministry officials led by Sada Hakubo went to 
Busan, a port city in southeast Korea, to secretly investigate the situation in Korea under 
the direction of the Dajokan (The Great Council of State), then Japan’s most powerful 
government organ. One of the directives to the secret investigators was to carry out a 
“full accounting of Ulleungdo and Dokdo under which circumstances they became part of 
Korean (Chosen) Territory.” After a year of investigation in Korea, the group submitted a 
report entitled “A Confidential Inquiry into the Particulars of Foreign Relations of 
Korea,” in 1870. This report reads that: 
Circumstances under which Takeshima (current Ulleungdo) 58  and 
Matsushima (current Dokdo) have become Korean possession: 
Regarding this case, Matsushima is an island adjacent to Takeshima and 
there has been made no document on it to date; concerning Takeshima, 
Korea sent people to settle there for a while after the Genroku period. 
Then the island became uninhabited as before. Bamboo, ditch reed, which 
is thicker than bamboo, and ginseng are found there. Besides, the island is 
said to be fit for fishing . . . 59 
This report shows that the Japanese recognized Ulleungdo and Dokdo as 
neighboring islands, which implies that they recognized Dokdo as Korean territory given 
that they clearly thought of Ulleungdo as Korean territory. In addition, apart from the 
contents of the report, the directives to the investigators show that the Meiji government 
recognized that Ulleungdo and Dokdo were part of Korean territory, i.e., the Meiji 
government sent them in order to know why these islands were Korean territory. This  
 
                                                 
57 Kim, A Comprehensive Bibliography of Dokdo, 314-315; Shin, Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokdo, 
89-93. 
58 Until the late 19th century, the Japanese referred Ulleungdo to Takeshima, and Dokdo as 
Matsushima. 
59 Kim, A Comprehensive Bibliography of Dokdo, 314-315; Shin, Korea’s Territorial Rights to Tokdo, 
89-93. 
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fact also clarifies the contradiction of the current Japanese government’s arguments that it 
incorporated Dokdo in 1905 and that, at the time, Dokdo was not owned by any country 
(terra nullius). 
Another example can be found in a Meiji government document from 1877. On 
October 16, 1876, when the Meiji government started compiling land registers, Shimane 
prefecture officially asked the Japanese Home Ministry whether Ulleungdo and Dokdo 
should be included within its sphere of jurisdiction. After months of thorough reflection, 
the Japanese Home Ministry concluded that Ulleungdo and Dokdo had been the territory 
of Korea as of 1692 and “had nothing to do with Japan.”60 
However, considering the importance of the territorial issue, the Home Ministry 
of the Meiji government asked for a final decision from the Dajokan in March 1877. On 
March 20 of the same year, the Dajokan instructed it to “bear in mind that that Ulleungdo 
and other island (Dokdo) have nothing to do with Japan.”61 Based on this final decision 
from the Meiji government, Shimane prefecture excluded Ulleungdo and Dokdo from its 
jurisdictional area. 
Since 1876, there were several Japanese who asked the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
to allow them to develop ownerless Matsushima (Ulleungdo) in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. 
In June 1876, Muto Heigaku first asked the Foreign Ministry, and in the following two 
years, several other Japanese made the same request to the Ministry.62  Finally, the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry decided to conduct an on-site survey of Matsushima. The 
Ministry sent the Japanese warship Amagi in July 1880, and the survey concluded that 
Matsushima was Korean territory and, thus, the Foreign Ministry turned down all the 
applications.63 
In November 1881, the Home Ministry inquired to the Foreign Ministry 
concerning the status of Ulleungdo with the instruction from Dajokan in 1877. The 
                                                 
60 Kim, A Comprehensive Bibliography of Dokdo, 344-346. 
61 The East Asian History Foundation, The History of Dokdo, 33. 
62 Kazuo Hori, “Japan’s Incorporation of Takeshima into Its Territory in 1905,” Korea Observer 28, 
no. 3 (1997): 492-494. 
63 Ibid., 494. 
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Foreign Ministry did not object the Dajokan’s instruction to exclude Ulleungdo and 
Dokdo from the Japanese territory, by which it acknowledged Korean sovereignty over 
the two islands, a position it maintained until 1905.  
In sum, prior to 1905, the Japanese governmental organizations—Dajokan, Home 
Ministry, and Foreign Ministry—knew and recognized that Ulleungdo and Dokdo were 
Korean territory. In 1905, Japan claimed Dokdo as terra nullius and incorporated it. 
2. Japanese Maps from before the War 
In the 17th century, Kawakami Hasayoshi made a colored map called Map of 
Korea (Chosen Chizu), which switched the names of Ulleungdo and Dokdo.64 In 1785, 
the Japanese scholar Hayashi Shihei finished A Map of Three Adjoining Countries, which 
displayed Korean territory in yellow and Japanese territory in red.65  On this map, the 
words “Korea’s possessions” or “belongs to Korea” are written next to Dokdo. 
Japanese maps from after the Meiji Restoration show the same perception of 
Ulleungdo and Dokdo as Korean territory. These maps include The Complete Map of 
Korea (Chosen Yochi zenzu) in 1875 by Sekiguchi Bisyo,66 and The Complete Map of 
Japan (Shochu nihon zenzu) in 1876 by Kashihara Yoshinaga.67  
In addition, the Japanese military’s maps also recognized Ulleungdo and Dokdo 
as Korean territory. These include Complete Map of Korea (Chosen Jenzu) in 1875 by 
the Ministry of Army;68 Map of Choson (Korea)’s Eastern Seashore (Kankoku tohe zu) 
in 1876 by the Hydrographic Office of the Ministry of the Japanese Navy;69 and Choson 
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Coast Pilot in 1899 by the same office.70 If Japan recognized Dokdo as its sovereign 
territory, it would have included it in the Map of the Northwest Coast or the Japan Coast 
Pilot. But Japan did not do so. “The emergence of such maps in Japan provides strong 
evidence that the Japanese had come to recognize Dokdo as part of Korea during the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.”71  
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III. OUTBREAK OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 
A. POWER STRUGGLE OVER MANCHURIA AND KOREA 
While the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) was a struggle for the mastery of 
Korea, the Russo-Japanese War was the result of another struggle between two countries 
which had the same expansionist ambition regarding Manchuria and Korea. The collision 
between the two countries seemed to be destined when Russia, after being blocked in its 
further expansion “to the west by Germany and Austria-Hungary and to the South by the 
British and French shoring-up of the Ottoman Empire,”72 turned its eye to the East in the 
1850s.73  
Russia had always wanted a warm water port. Vladivostok (‘Rule the East’74 or 
‘Lord of the East’75), Russia’s first port in the Far East, implicitly showed the empire’s 
interest in this area. Russia acquired Kamchatka in the seventeenth century and acquired 
Sakhalin in 1875 in exchange for ceding the Kurile Islands to Japan. 76  Russia’s 
announcement of its Siberian Railway project in 1891 was enough to make Japan feel 
threatened. Russia’s increasing ambition in Manchuria and Korea was expressed once 
again when Nicholas II visited Japan with several warships after the inauguration of the 
railway scheme at Vladivostok: one of the warships was the Manjour (Manchuria) and 
another was the Koreyetz (Korea).77  
This section examines four reasons for the origins of the Russo-Japanese War:  
Japanese anti-Russian sentiment after the Sino-Japanese war; the aggressive 
encroachment of Russia with Manchuria and Korea; the Japanese need to ensure its 
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sphere of influence in Korea; and the failure of negotiations to compromise between the 
two countries.  An additional argument will be made that direct and indirect support of 
Japan by Great Britain and the United States encouraged Japan to dare a war with Russia.  
1. Memory of the Sino-Japanese War 
The Sino-Japanese War was a conflict between China and Japan for the mastery 
of Korea. The war began when the Japanese navy launched a surprise attack on a Chinese 
steamer in Korean Bay on July 25, 1894. On August 1, the two countries officially 
declared war on each other.  The war clearly showed the different results of each 
country’s modernization. After humiliating the Chinese military (mostly Li Hung-
Chang’s Huai army and the Peiyang fleet) both on land and at sea, Japan highhandedly 
signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. It provided for: 1) recognition of 
Korean independence; 2) an indemnity of 200 million taels to Japan; 3) cession of 
Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan; 4) the opening of 
Chungking, Soochow, Hangchow, and Sha-Shi as ports; and 5) the right of Japanese 
nationals to open factories and engage in industry and manufacturing in China.78 
Unlike China, Russia did not accept Japan’s gain in North East Asia, as the 
Russian minister Count Cassini hinted to the Chinese government: “Japan will not be 
permitted, either now or in the future, to seize upon any part of Manchuria or the 
mainland.”79 Russia instigated France, a partner in the Dual Alliance, and Germany, 
which wanted Russia to be preoccupied in the East so as not to pose a threat in Europe, to 
intervene.80 In a joint note, the three parties warned Japan that “the possession of the 
Liaotung Peninsula by Japan would menace Peking, render illusory the independence of 
Korea, and threaten the general peace of the Far East”81 and demanded a favorable 
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response within forty-eight hours. It was impossible for Japan to declare another war so 
soon after the Sino-Japanese war. At this juncture, a Japanese cabinet minister cried, “If 
we only had three battleships we would declare war against Russia within twenty-four 
hours. We have but one, recently captured from China, and it will not be fit for service 
within six months, while the tsar has six here in our harbors. What can we do but submit 
to this insolent threat?”82 Japan reluctantly decided to retrocede Liaotung to China in 
return for 30 million taels. From that day Japan put every effort into strengthening its 
military capabilities; adopting the naval system of England and the military system of 
Germany; sending its smartest officials to Western countries to learn about their 
advanced industry, technology, and administrative know-how; all the while, it waited for 
the right chance to revenge the arrogant Slav.  
2. Russian Threat 
In addition to these bad memories regarding Russia, the Japanese viewed Russia’s 
expansion toward East Asia as an imminent threat. Considering that the Korean peninsula 
was “a dagger thrust at the heart of Japan,”83 Japan realized that if the Korean Peninsula 
fell under the influence of Russia, there would no longer be a buffer between the two 
countries and that, in the worst case, Japan might become the next victim of Russia’s 
imperialistic expansion. Therefore, the “independence” of Korea was critical not only to 
secure Japanese interests in Manchuria and Korea but also to secure Japan itself. 
However, contrary to Japanese wishes, the tsar continued his expansion toward 
the east both in Manchuria and Korea. After the Triple Intervention, China regarded 
Russia as a savior that defended it from Japanese aggression. In response, China allowed 
Russia to establish the Russo-Chinese Bank and granted it a concession to extend the 
Trans-Siberian Railway, which was begun in 1891, across Manchuria to Vladivostok. 
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Most important, Russia and China signed a secret alliance on June 3, 1896.84 However, 
Russia’s image as a savior of China lasted only until Russia sent troops to Port Arthur 
and Dalny on the Liaotung Peninsula on December 16, 1897.85 In March 1898, Russia 
acquired the right to lease Port Arthur and Dalny for twenty-five years and to construct a 
Southern Manchurian Railway from the two ports. Other Western powers dashed to take 
advantage of the vulnerability of China in decline, i.e., to “slice the melon.”  This 
provided the catalyst for the Boxer Rebellion, which began in 1899.  
The Boxer Rebellion gave Western countries, especially Russia, a good excuse to 
send their troops to Manchuria. Russian troops did not withdraw even after the repression 
of the riots. After signing the Anglo-Japanese alliance treaty in January 1902, Japan, with 
the support of Great Britain and the United States, demanded that Russia withdraw its 
troops from Manchuria. On April 4, 1902 Russia agreed to withdraw its troops in six-
month intervals until the end of 1903.  That summer, Russian Finance Minister Witte 
visited Manchuria and provided assurances that Russia would resolve this issue by 
“peaceful means.” However, the Governor of the Liaotung Peninsula, Admiral Alekseev, 
cancelled the second stage of the withdrawal that had been due for completion on 8 
October 1903.  
In addition to Russia’s approach to Manchuria, Japan was concerned about 
Russia’s increasing influence on Korea. For instance, in 1896 Russia acquired mining 
rights in Kyongwon and Chongsong counties, Hamgyong province; was permitted to 
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establish a coaling station on Wolmi Island, off Inchon; and acquired timber rights in the 
Yalu River basin and on Ulleungdo.86 In 1898, Russia was permitted to establish a 
coaling station on Yongdo, off Busan, and acquired an authorization to establish a 
Russia-Korean Bank. Even more, in May 1903, Alekseev moved troops to a port called 
Yongampo near the Manchuria—Korea border, on the pretext of protecting its timber 
rights and personnel; once there, the Russians bought land and constructed housing, and 
formally leased the area in July 1903.87 When faced the Japanese strong protest, Russia 
backed down from making this area into its military base: but, Russia could use 
Yongampo as a trading port.88 A growing anxiety among the Japanese at that time was 
well shown in the telegram from the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Komura, 
to the Japanese Minister in St. Petersburg, on July 28, 1903. 
The unconditioned and permanent occupation of Manchuria by Russia 
would create a state of things prejudicial to the security and interests of 
Japan…. If Russia were established on the flank of Korea, it would be a 
constant menace to the separate existence of that Empire, or at least would 
make Russia the dominant Power in Korea. Korea is an important outpost 
in Japan’s line of defense… Moreover, the political as well as commercial 
and industrial interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are 
paramount over those of other Powers. These interests and influence, 
Japan, having regard to her own security, cannot consent to surrender to or 
share with another Power.89 
Under the circumstances, several meetings between Japanese high officials and 
military leaders concluded that they must stop Russia’s encroachments; finally, on June 
23, 1903 Emperor Meiji agreed that Japan should fight a war with Russia, when 
necessary.90  
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3. Japan Wanted Korea Itself 
In addition to the aforementioned reasons, and most importantly, Japan wanted 
Korea itself.91 The idea of a “Korean expedition” (征韓論, in Japanese Sei-kan-ron) and 
advancing to the continent evolved right after the opening of Japan by the United States 
in 1854: Japan wanted to compensate for the losses it suffered under the terms of the 
unequal treaties imposed by the Western powers by conquering weak Korea and 
Manchuria.  This idea was revived after the Meiji restoration in 1868, when Korea 
rejected a Japanese request to revise relations between the two countries. While the idea 
was under debate in Japan,92 the members of the so-called “Iwakura Mission” (1871-
1873) led by Iwakura Tomomi (岩倉具視) returned to Japan in September 1873.93 
Iwakura and his supporters, who had seen the Western powers’ civilization, 
technology, and highly developed industry, argued that it was not time for conquer Korea, 
but rather to strengthen Japan. After strong political debate over the issue, Iwakura finally 
obtained an emperor’s edict not to invade Korea.94 However, this did not mean that Japan 
had abandoned its ambitions toward Korea. After finalizing the exchange of Sakhalin and 
Kurile with Russia, Japan opened Korea by signing of the Treaty of Kangwha in 1876, in 
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much the same way as Commodore Perry had done with Japan itself in 1854.95 When 
Japan started its expansionist movement, Yamagata Aritomo (山縣有朋), then Japan’s 
leading strategist, stated that:  
The independence and security of the nation depend first upon the 
protection of the line of advantage… If we wish to maintain the nation’s 
independence among the powers of the world at the present time, it is not 
enough to guard only the line of sovereignty; we must also defend the line 
of advantage… and within the limits of the nation’s resources gradually 
strive for that position.96 
In 1890, Korea was within the Japanese “line of advantage” and when Japan had 
achieved its dominant position over Korea after the Sino-Japanese war, the line of 
advantage extended into southern Manchuria, allowing Japan to defend its prominent 
influence and interests on Korea.97  
Moreover, Japan also had several practical reasons to fight the war. Compared to 
the relatively small size of the islands of Japan (148,756 square miles), Japan’s 
population was exploding, causing new concerns about their food supply.98 Korea was of 
vital interest to Japan given that Japan depended heavily on Korea for additional food 
supplies to feed its people.99 In terms of commerce and industry, Korea was crucial not 
only for acquiring raw materials to run Japan’s fast-developing industries, but also as a 
market to export its manufactured goods. Moreover, Japan had spent a great deal of 
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money to develop the infrastructure in Korea.100  Japan was also deeply engaged in 
mining, fisheries, postal service, bank, and education.101 Altogether, Japanese social, 
economic, military, and political interests in Korea were too extensive and vital for Japan 
to yield to Western powers, especially, in this case, Russia. Therefore, Japan prepared to 
secure its interests in Korea. 
4. Negotiations and Diplomacy 
Even though Japan wanted to exert its influence both on Manchuria and Korea, it 
did not want to fight a war with Russia, preferring to compromise with it instead. The 
idea of Man-kan kokan (Manchuria for Korea or Manchuria-Korea Exchange), which 
would acknowledge Russia’s dominant position in Manchuria in return for Russia’s 
acknowledgement of Japan’s influence in Korea, originated when Russia’s influence in 
Korea expanded in the late 19th century.102 In 1896, Japan negotiated a Man-Kan kokan 
agreement with Russia; on April 18, 1898, both countries reached another agreement 
concerning the Korean issue.103 In May 1901, Katsura Taro became the prime minister, 
who had more aggressive position to Russia than his precedent Marquis Ito Hirobumi. 104  
Ito privately went to St. Petersburg to bring the matter to a peaceful settlement. 
But, while he was conferring with the Russian ministers, Finance Minister Witte and 
Foreign Minister Lamsdorf, the Japanese minister in London, Hayashi Tadasu, was 
negotiating to form an alliance with Great Britain.105 The alliance treaty between Great 
Britain and Japan was revealed in January 1902, and there was no further progress in 
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negotiation with Russia. In the summer of 1903, when Russia broke its word to withdraw 
its troops from Manchuria, Japan again tried to negotiate with Russia. Between October 
16, 1903, and January 13, 1904, the two countries exchanged their drafts for negotiation. 
However, it was impossible to find a compromise between them.  
Meanwhile, both countries continuously strengthened their military power “half-
expecting war, but not really believing it would come.” 106  In fact, Russia was not 
committed to a war, because the tsar thought that “there will be no war because I do not 
wish it.”107 In contrast, Japan began planning for war at the end of 1903. On December 
28, a Supreme War Council was established at a special cabinet meeting and, on 
December 30, the Japanese decided that “China must remain neutral throughout the war, 
while Korea would be placed under Japanese military domination.”108 At this point, even 
Yamagata Aritomo, who was previously reluctant to fight a war, argued for sending 
troops to Korea.  His suggestion was rejected, mainly because Navy Minister Yamamoto 
insisted that the navy was not ready for transportation and that sending troops to Korea at 
that juncture might result in a situation that was disadvantageous to Japan.109 In January 
1904, Japan learned that Russia was planning to reinforce its fleet in the Far East. There 
was a sense in Japan that, if Japan should have to fight the war, Japan ought to start it 
before Russia could have naval superiority. Therefore, Japan’s final proposal to Russia on 
January 13, 1904 was designed to earn time rather than to resolve the Manchurian-
Korean problem by peaceful means.  
By this point, Japan was determined to fight the war. However, had it not been for 
the existence of its alliances, Japan might not have made the same decision. Great Britain 
had been an ally of Japan since 1902, and the United States had entered into an implicit 
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alliance to Japan when it declared the “open door” policy, which was directed at Russia’s 
expansion in China. Japan also wanted President Roosevelt to act as a mediator when 
“they were not sure they could win, could not afford to lose, and felt compelled to 
wage.”110 President Roosevelt did not disappoint the Japanese, as was evidenced by his 
letter to his friend Cecil Spring-Rice, on July 24, 1905:  
As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France in the most 
polite and discreet fashion that in event of a combination against Japan to 
try to do what Russia, Germany, and France did to her in 1894, I should 
promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary 
on her behalf. I of course knew that your government would act in the 
same way, and I thought it best that I should have no consultation with 
your people before announcing my own purpose.111 
B. BEGINNING OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 
1. Comparative Strength of Russia and Japan 
a. Navy 
The Russian Navy was larger than the Japanese. However, it had a critical 
weak point: it was divided between the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Pacific.112 The 
Pacific Squadron was further divided by the Korean Peninsula, with the Port Arthur fleet 
to the west of it and the Vladivostok to the east.113 In contrast, the Japanese navy 
possessed a big advantage in that it would be fighting in the vicinity of its naval base. The 
Russian Pacific Squadron had seven battleships, seven cruisers, twenty-five destroyers 
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and twenty-seven smaller ships before the outbreak of the war.114 The Japanese Navy had 
six battleships, ten cruisers, forty destroyers and forty smaller ships.115 While the Russian 
Navy was superior in quantity, the Japanese Navy was superior in quality, uniformity, 
and speed. Port Arthur, where the main part of the Russian Fleet stationed, was old and 
not adequate to meet the needs of the combat fleet; this was proved during the war.116  
Vladivostok, where the rest of the Russian Pacific Fleet was stationed, was freezing three 
months a year. Japan had four naval bases; all of them were well fortified and suitable for 
serving their fleet.117  
The Japanese navy was also superior in the quality of crew members. The 
Russian crews were inferior to Japan’s in several perspectives; they were poorly trained; 
they spent little time at sea; they spent little ammunition on gunnery training; not all of 
them were highly motivated; some of them were not familiar with sea operation; not all 
of them were literate.118 In contrast, the Japanese crews were intensively trained: they 
spent much more time at sea under British instructors; most of them had backgrounds 
related to sea operations; most of them were highly motivated; and most of them were 
literate.119  
b. Army 
Russia had a standing army of more than a million men; counting the 
reserves (every able-bodied man was a reservist), the 345,000 Cossacks and the militia, 
Russia could quickly mobilize 4,500,000 soldiers. In 1900, there were some 150,000 
Russian troops in the Far East, but, as a result of the treaty with China, the number was 
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reduced, so that when diplomatic relations were severed, there were only 80,000 Russian 
soldiers in Siberia and Manchuria and along the Korean border.120 
In the beginning of 1904, just before the war began, the Japanese 
maintained a standing army of 180,000 men; reserves and others brought the total to 
850,000.121 The Japanese army was smaller than that of Russia’s, but it was concentrated 
in Asia which proved to be prominent advantage to Japan in the war.  In overall quality, 
the Japanese weapons were about the same as those of the Russians. The Russians had 
developed a rapid-firing field piece, but not many of these had reached the Far East by 
the time of the opening of the war. The Japanese did not have machine guns at the 
beginning of the war, but adopted Hotchkiss machine guns during the war. The Russians 
had Maxim machine guns.122 
c. Intelligence 
The situation of Russia might be described as one of unpreparedness and 
ignorance, which was caused by its arrogant conceit and underestimation of its enemy. 
Russia did not see the need to get information about its enemy, which it referred to as an 
“infantile monkey.”123  The Russian leadership in St. Petersburg did not pay attention to 
the information from the Russian legation in Tokyo. As a result, Russian leaders were 
ignorant about Japanese readiness and capability.  
In contrast, Japan had begun to ascertain the strength of the Russians in 
1892 under the direction of the Japanese Field Marshal Yamagata, who emphasized the 
importance of the intelligence.124 Japan had solid spy networks such as Colonel Motojiro 
Akashi’s network in Europe and Colonel Aoki’s in the Far East.  These networks offered 
exact information for timely and appropriate decision making by the Japanese leaders, 
while manipulating opponent movements in Russia or confusing Russian leaders by 
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spreading false rumor and information. Japan also recruited many double agents by 
paying them much more money than Russia did. Indeed, Japan was familiar with the 
theater of the war, Manchuria and Korea, where they fought the Sino-Japanese War.  
2. Surprise Attack on Port Arthur 
On February 1, 1904, Field Marshall Iwao Oyama, Chief of General Staff, asked 
Emperor Meiji for permission to go to war, and on February 5, the Emperor agreed. On 
the same day, Japan severed diplomatic relations with Russia. On February 6, the 
Japanese Combined Fleet Commander, Admiral Togo, led the First and Second Fleets out 
of Sasebo harbor; the fleets consisted of six battleships, ten cruisers, thirty destroyers and 
forty torpedo boats.125 On February 7, the Japanese seized Masampo in Southern Korea, 
and began landing troops. On the same day, Admiral Togo sent ten destroyers to conduct 
a surprise attack on Port Arthur after ascertaining that the majority of the Russian fleet 
was outside the harbor at Port Arthur.126 He clearly knew that the result of the war would 
be determined by command of the sea. 
Vice-Admiral Oskar Viktorovich Stark, then the commander of the Russian 
Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur, had wanted to be prepared for the probable Japanese 
attack. 127  However, when he asked Admiral Evegenii Ivanovici Alekseev, then the 
Viceroy of the Far East of Russia, for permission to have his squadron be ready for action, 
Alekseev denied his request. As a result, the larger ships of the squadron were laid in the 
roadstead outside the inner harbor and had not even put out anti-torpedo nets. 
Nevertheless, Vice-Admiral Stark assigned two destroyers to sweep the entrance of the 
harbor; he also had ordered one cruiser, the Pallada, to do a duty mission with her search 
light. The two destroyers sighted several suspicious ships sailing without lights at night, 
and returned to their base quickly. When they were reporting to their commander, the 
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Japanese attack was launched around 0200.128 The Pallada (6,800 tons) was the first 
victim because her search light gave the enemy a good target. Next, the Retvizan (12,900 
tons) and the Tsesarevich (13,100 tons) were hit by Japanese torpedo attacks. The 
torpedo attack was not precise, but it was effective: three torpedoes out of sixteen 
damaged Russia’s new and important battleships. 129  Although Togo’s surprise night 
attack was not decisive enough to destroy the Russian Pacific Squadron, the Japanese 
Combined Fleet was able to establish temporary command of the sea.130 
Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Uryu was escorting three transports to Inchon (then 
called Chemulpo) with five cruisers and eight torpedo boats.  On the morning of February 
8, the force met the scout ship Chiyoda, which had gone into the harbor earlier and now 
reported that the Russian cruiser Varyag and the gunboat the Korietz were in anchorage at 
the harbor, along with British, French, Italian and American warships.131 Ascertaining 
that the Japanese naval force was superior to Russia’s, Admiral Uryu decided to land the 
troops that afternoon. As the Japanese began moving toward the harbor entrance, they 
saw the Russian gunship, the Korietz, coming out of the harbor. When the captain of the 
Korietz saw the aggressively maneuvering Japanese ships to him, he opened fire to them 
and retreated to the harbor. This was actually the very first shot of the war.132 The 
Japanese attack force moved into the harbor and landed its troops.133  In the morning of 
February 9, Admiral Uryu sent an ultimatum to the Russian ships: they must steam out of 
the harbor before noon, or the Japanese forces would sink them at anchor.  The Russian 
ships sailed out and fought, but the result was already settled: the Japanese quickly  
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defeated the Russian vessels. As a result of the surprise attacks on Port Arthur and Inchon, 
Japan established command of the sea in the Yellow Sea, and this situation was 
maintained until the end of the war.134 
 
 
Figure 2.   The Japanese Attack on Port Arthur135  
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Figure 3.   The Theater of the Russo-Japanese War136 
3. The Korea-Japanese Protocol and Militarization of Korea 
As soon as the Japanese troops landed at Inchon, fifteen hundred of them were 
sent by train to Seoul to occupy the capital.137 Anticipating a war between Russia and 
Japan, the Korean government officially had proclaimed its neutrality on January 16, 
1904. However, Japan demanded that the Korean government sign the Korean-Japanese  
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Protocol Agreement on February 23, 1904,138  while its troops surrounded the royal 
palace. Based on this document, Japan expanded its authority to occupy or expropriate 
areas deemed necessary for the stationing of troops, or those with strategic military value 
to guarantee the “independence and territorial integrity” of the Korean Empire (Articles 2 
and 3).  Most importantly, to defend Korea from dangers, Japan could “occupy such 
places as may be necessary from the strategic point of view, when circumstances require 
it.” In other words, based on the Protocol, the Japanese military had the right to reside 
and employ its troops in Korea and occupy and expropriate strategic points in Korean 
territory. 139  Based on this agreement, Japan expropriated totally 9, 750, 000 pyong 
(3.3m²/pyong) from Yongsan, Pyongyang, and Paekma (south of Wiju).140  In addition, 
Japan started laying the Seoul-Wiju and Seoul-Busan railroads, commandeered the 
telegraph network, and took navigation rights on Korean rivers and in Korean coastal 
waters. 
In the midst of the Russo-Japanese War, Japan coerced Korea into signing the 
Korean-Japan Agreement on August 22, 1904.  By this treaty, Japan had the authority to 
designate diplomatic and financial “advisors” for the administration of the Korean 
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government.141 “Numerous Japanese advisors were brought in, and, step by step, the 
administration was Japanized.”142 Consequently, Korea gradually lost its fundamental 
rights and authority to exist as a sovereign independent state.  
Concerning the contradiction of the treaty which ensured the Japan’s right to 
designate appropriate “advisors” to Korea as its discretion and emphasized, at the same 
time, the “independence and the integrity of territory” of Korea, the Japanese Minister to 
Korea frankly said: “Japan is confronted by a most difficult problem—to maintain the 
fiction of Korean independence while practically establishing a protectorate, and yet to 
avoid assuming the responsibilities of a governing power.143 
While the Russian Pacific Squadron did not actively engage to the Japanese navy, 
the Japanese Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Gentaro Kodama, ordered the landing of 
the rest of the 12th infantry division at Inchon on February 16. He ordered the 2nd and 
Guards Divisions to land just south of Pyongyang between March 14 and 21. These 
divisions were grouped with the 12th division into the Japanese First Army, under 
General Tametoko Kuroki. After defeating minor resistance from the Russian troops in 
Pyoungyang, the Japanese First Army marched north to the Yalu, and, thus, Japan 
accomplished its first aim of the war, i.e., securing its influence and interests in Korea. 
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WAR 
1. A Short Revived Russian Morale: The Death of Makarov 
On March 8, Vice Admiral Stepan O. Makarov, who was one of the most 
respected commanders in the Russian navy, was appointed to replace Vice-Admiral 
Oskar V. Stark, who had been in charge of the port at the time of the Japanese surprise 
attack. His appointment itself seemed to be enough to revive the fighting spirit and 
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morale of the Pacific Squadron. Right after Makarov’s arrival, the Russian fleet sailed out 
to face the Japanese fleet. On March 10, the Russian destroyers engaged in a fierce fight 
with Japanese flotillas outside Port Arthur; the next day, Makarov sailed out to search for 
the Japanese.144 Although there was no outstanding outcome, it was enough to stimulate 
the Russian sailors’ morale.  As the morale of the Russian sailors revived, their 
performance was also enhanced. By the beginning of April, the Retvizan and the 
Tsarevitch were refloated, further boosting morale. The Japanese learned about this 
change because the Russians now fought instead of running for their harbor.  
In addition to the revival of Port Arthur, the Vladivostok cruiser’s vigorous 
operation since the outbreak of the war was enough to make the Japanese feel threatened. 
Furthermore, if the Russian Pacific fleets at Port Arthur and Vladivostok were to be 
combined, control of the sea might transfer to Russia. Admiral Togo felt an imminent 
need to defeat the rising morale and ability of the Russians, and so he made a plan to lure 
Makarov to his death. 
On April 12, the Japanese laid mines at high tide in the Russian ships’ usual 
pathways. On the morning of April 13, Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian 
destroyers, sinking one and damaging another. Admiral Makarov boarded his flagship, 
the Petropavlovsk, and sortied out. When the Japanese Combined Fleet’s battleships 
approached, Admiral Makarov did not go further because, knowing that his crews needed 
more gunnery exercise, he wanted to be under the cover of shore batteries, However, at 
that time it was low tide, when Makarov ordered a return to port, his flagship, the 
Petropavlovsk, struck a mine and sank in minutes, taking with it Makarov and 662 crew 
members.145 Half an hour later, the battleship the Pobeda also struck a mine, though it 
did not sink. With the death of Makarov, the fighting spirit of the Russians at Port Arthur 
also died, and his successor, Vilhelm Karlovich Vitgeft, directed by Viceroy Alekseev to 
take no risks, did not try to sortie out any more until June.146 
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After the death of Makarov, Russia opened a conference and decided to send its 
Baltic Fleet to the Far East. On April 19, they renamed the Pacific Squadron as the 
Russian First Squadron in the Pacific. They renamed the Russian Baltic Fleet as the 
Second Squadron and appointed Admiral Zinovy Petrovich Rozhestvensky to command 
the Fleet. It took months for Rozhestvensky to reshaping and preparing for their 
legendary 29,000 kilometers voyage. However, he could weigh anchor to the East in 
October 1904 only after the First Squadron, both at Port Arthur and Vladivostok, became 
collapsed in August, 1904. Even more, the Second Fleet received the fall of Port Arthur, 
their destination, en route. 
2. Japanese Attempts to Bottle Up Port Arthur 
Since the initial phase of the war, Admiral Togo planned to block Port Arthur. 
The first attempt was executed on February 24 with five Japanese transports, but 
failed.147 On March 27, the Japanese tried to block the harbor with four transports, but 
failed again. 148  Facing the inactiveness of the Russians after the death of Admiral 
Makarov, Admiral Togo decided to try again to bottle up the Russian fleet. On May 3, the 
Japanese navy executed its third attempt to block the harbor with twelve vessels. This 
operation was quite bolder than previous ones in February and March, considering the 
plan required the Japanese Second Army to land on the soil of Russian influence just 
sixty miles from Port Arthur.149 Indeed, this mission also closely coincided with the 
Japanese First Army’s ground battle at Yalu River, though that battle consequently 
started earlier than the blockade attempt. 
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In the heavy seas, eight Japanese ships out of twelve finally made their attempts 
to block the entrance of Port Arthur on the night of May 3.  The Russians had installed 
two booms across the outer entrance to the harbor, Admiral Togo, assuming that the 
booms had been placed inside the harbor’s mouth, believed that the blockage mission had 
succeeded when some of his ships reported that they had passed the booms.150 Even 
though Admiral Togo could not clearly ascertain the situation of the enemy the next 
morning due to dense fog, he falsely reported that the blockade mission had been 
successful.151 Based on this report, the Japanese Second Army, which had departed from 
a port near Pyongyang on May 3, implemented its disembarkation at Pitzewo, sixty 
kilometers north of Dalny in the Lioatung Peninsula, on the morning of May 5. 
Fortunately for the Japanese, they finished their landing without Russian interference. 
However, Admiral Togo still could not leave Port Arthur when he found that the mission 
had not been successful. 
3. The Battle of Yalu River 
Contrary to Japanese expectations before the war, which had assumed some 
resistance from the Russian army, Japanese movement in Korea was relatively favorable. 
As a result, the Japanese army could send their troops as many as they could. General 
Kuroki was appointed as commander of the Japanese First Army, and his Army had 
landed in Korea by March 29, 1904. 152  In Russia, General Aleksei Nikolaevich 
Kuropatkin, the former War Minister of Russian, was appointed as a commander of the 
Russian military troops in Manchuria on February 20. When Kuroki was fighting in 
Pyongyang, Kuropatkin arrived in Harbin on March 27, and Liaoyang, his main 
Manchurian base, on March 28.153  
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The gap between the belligerents was closing; however, the level of readiness 
between them was totally different. The Japanese were well aware of the battlefield and 
possessed good intelligence about their enemy, while the Russians were hurriedly being 
mobilized without proper information and intelligence. It took as long as six weeks to 
mobilize an infantry unit, and this was the first task which the Russians had to 
accomplish.154 So Kuroki was able to reach the south bank of Yalu River without specific 
resistance from the Russians. Furthermore, there was another challenge to General 
Kuropatkin’s leadership.  Kuropatkin, who understood the Japanese military’s potential, 
wanted to begin by cautiously engaging the Japanese, and wait to launch a decisive 
counterattack until sufficient reinforcements were in place.  However, Viceroy Alekseev, 
heedlessly argued for an immediate confrontation and defeat of the enemy.155 Meanwhile, 
the first major combat between the two countries’ troops were waiting for them, i.e., the 
Battle of Yalu River.  
 
Figure 4.   The Battle of Yalu River156 
On the northwest bank of the Yalu River, the Russians, led by General M. I. 
Zasulich, numbered about 19,000.  More than 42,000 Japanese led by General Kuroki 
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were on the southeast bank.157 General Kuroki decided to deceive the Russians; he 
pretended that the Japanese attack would be from the main channel of the Yalu River by 
constructing a bridge in the main channel of the river, while, behind the scenes, several 
portable bridges were built to prepare for the last decisive moment for bridging.158 
Overall, ten bridges were built under the Russians’ shelling.159 However, Kuroki’s main 
attack force, the Twelfth Division, was planned to outflank the Russian’s left after 
crossing the Yalu River thirteen miles northeast of Wiju. The Russians, on the other hand, 
wasted their ammunition while trying to destroy the bridge; in the process, they revealed 
their position to the Japanese. The Russians did not try to cover their troops, guns, or 
positions. 
On April 26 and 27, the Japanese occupied a series of islands in the Yalu River 
and moved 4.7 inch Krupp Howitzers to one of the islands. On the night of April 29, the 
Japanese Second and Guard Divisions started crossing the Yalu River, while the Twelfth 
Division outflanked to north of the river to cover the other divisions’ assault. On the 
morning of April 30, the howitzers concealed on the island silenced the inferior Russian 
guns.160 Major General N. A. Kashitalinskii, who commanded the Russian left, had 
already asked Zasulich to reinforce their left, but the latter denied this request.161 As a 
result, the Russian army was mainly concentrated on the Japanese Second and Guard 
Divisions side and was not prepared for the Japanese outflanking maneuver. The battle 
ended when the Russians retreated in the evening to the northwest. The Russians 
absorbed 5,000 casualties, while the Japanese had 2,000.162 However, the impact of the 
battle was formidable: by showing its competiveness, Japan could raise loans from Great 
Britain and the United States as well as upgrade its image as a world class army.163 And 
most importantly, Japan consolidated its occupation of Korea. 
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4. The Battle of Nanshan and Isolation of Port Arthur 
On May 5, General Oku’s Second Army commenced landing on the Liaotung 
Peninsula, specifically at Pitzewo, sixty kilometers north of Dalny, with the Japanese 
navy’s assistance. Since it was ebb tide, the Japanese ships could not approach the shore. 
So the Japanese troops jumped overboard and waded waist-deep for about one kilometer. 
But there were no Russians at the landing place.164 After defeating minor resistance from 
the Russian troops, General Oku’s advance detachment cut off the telegraph wire and 
destroyed the railroad, thus severing communication between Port Arthur and the rest of 
Manchuria.165 On May 16, the Japanese Second Army moved across the Kwantung 
Peninsula. Meanwhile, on May 19, General Nozu Michitsura’s Fourth Army landed at 
Takushan on the northern reaches of the Liaotung Peninsula.166  
The Japanese movement meant not only that the Port Arthur would be isolated, 
but that the Japanese troops were between the Russians. The Russians had about thirty 
thousand soldiers under Lieutenant General Stessel in Port Arthur, and another troop was 
in Liaoyang under General Kuropatkin. It was a time when the Russians should and could 
have interrupted the Japanese landing and further movement in the Liaotung Peninsula, 
because the Japanese were vulnerable while waiting for further reinforcements. However, 
the passivity of Stessel and Kuropatkin allowed the Japanese Second Army’s 
reinforcements to arrive and its southwestern march to Nanshan to begin.167 
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Figure 5.   The Battle of Nanshan168  
Nanshan is at a point where Liaotung Peninsula narrows briefly to about four 
miles and becomes the Kwantung peninsula. To the west of Nanshan is Chinchou Bay, 
Talienwan Bay is to the east, and Dalny is located twenty-five kilometers south of 
Nanshan.169 The Japanese forces numbered about 38,000 and the Russians had about 
18,000.170  The Japanese navy assisted the operation by sending several gunships to 
Chinchou Bay, where the Russians did not expect the Japanese, while the Russians sent a 
gunboat to Talienwan Bay.  
The Japanese started their attack on the night of May 25 with three divisions. 
Even under the overwhelming Japanese attacks, the Russians did not send in their reserve 
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troops, which were six miles from the battlefield, so the actual number of troops engaged 
in the battle was merely 3,000. The Russian navy at Port Arthur had a dozen destroyers 
which they might have sent to defeat the Japanese gunboats in Chinchou Bay. But they 
sent some only after the Japanese left. Consequently, on the evening of May 26, the 
Russians retreated, and the Japanese won the battle and acquired Dalny, a precious 
commercial harbor. Japan lost almost 5,000 troops, while the Russians lost less than 
1,000. The battle of Nanshan consolidated the isolation of Port Arthur, and capturing 
Dalny gave Japan a precious harbor near Port Arthur. The Japanese did not have to try 
amphibious landings anymore and could start their siege of Port Arthur from the land. On 
May 28, the Japanese navy convoyed reinforcement troops to Dalny without any Russian 
interference, and General Oku’s Second Army turned to the north, aiming for 
Kuropatkin’s troops in Liaoyang.171 
The Japanese established and assigned the Third Army besiege Port Arthur. 
General Maresuke Nogi, who was the legendary conqueror of Port Arthur in 1894 during 
the Sino-Japanese War, was appointed to command the Third Army, and arrived at Dalny 
on June 6, 1904. Now, everything was set for the main battle in Manchuria. The Japanese 
Second, Fourth, and First Armies (roughly from the west to the east of the Manchuria) 
were heading for Liaoyang, while the Third Army started preparing the siege of Port 
Arthur. 
                                                 
171 Luntinen and Menning, “The Russian Army at War, 1904-05,” 238. 
 51
IV. INCORPORATION OF DOKDO BY JAPAN 
A. JAPAN AFTER THE MEIJI RESTORATION 
The new Meiji leaders quickly recognized the superiority of Western technology 
and modern industry. Thus, rather than resist and be defeated by the West, Meiji leaders 
pursued “relations of amity” with Western powers, adopted the vocabulary of 
“Realpolitik” based on the concept of Social Darwinism, and spoke of jakuniku-kyoshoku 
(the strong devour the weak).172 The Japanese also used every effort to “transform” its 
empire and people.173 The Meiji government’s policy was largely influenced by the 
report of the “Iwakura Mission.” The Iwakura Mission was one of the most prominent 
Japanese efforts to “discover the source of power and wealth;”174 it travelled the United 
States and twelve highly developed European countries.175  
Instead of being overwhelmed by Western civilization, however, the members of 
the mission were confident that Japan could catch up to the West through careful 
planning. Kime Kunitake, Iwakura’s chief secretary on the embassy staff, reflected that:  
Most of the countries in Europe shine with the light of civilization and 
abound in wealth and power. Their trade is prosperous, their technology is 
superior, and they greatly enjoy the pleasures and comforts of life. When 
one observes such conditions, one is apt to think that these countries have 
always been like this, but this is not the case—the wealth and prosperity 
one sees now in Europe dates to an appreciable degree from the period 
after 1800. It has taken scarcely forty years to produce such conditions… 
How different the Europe of today is from the Europe of forty years ago 
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can be imagined easily. There were no trains running on the land; there 
were no steamships operating on the water. There was no transmission of 
news by telegraph…Those who read this should reflect upon the lesson to 
be drawn for Japan.176 
Another thing the Japanese learned was the role of the international law in 
Realpolitik. According to Henry Wheaton’s classic Elements of International Law, which 
was published in 1836, international law was “limited to the civilized and Christian 
people in Europe or to those of European origin.”177 It was translated into Japanese in the 
mid-1860s, and accepted by the Meiji leaders. Kido Koin (木戸孝允), a prominent leader 
from Chosu, wrote in his diary about the characteristics of the international law: 
There is an urgent need for Japan to become strong enough militarily to 
take a stand against the Western powers. As long as our country is lacking 
in military power, the law of nations is not to be trusted. When dealing 
with those who are weak, the strong nations often invoke public law but 
really calculate their own gain. Thus it seems to me that the law of nations 
is merely a tool for the conquest of the weak.178 
After that, Meiji Japan legally expanded its territory. Japan incorporated 
Hokkaido in 1869, Okinawa in 1871, and Taiwan in 1895. Senkaku/Diaoyu Dao, which 
is currently occupied by Japan, and claimed both by China and Taiwan, was incorporated 
by Japan on January 14, 1895. The Japanese claimed that a Japanese national, 
Tatsushioro Koga, discovered and effectively occupied Senkaku/Diaoyu Dao in 1884, 
and that Japan annexed the terra nullis on January 14, 1895. However, in fact, the 
Japanese government had rejected the Okinawa Prefecture’s application to incorporate 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Dao three times (in 1885, 1890, and 1893) because it worried that an  
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attempt to incorporate the island might cause a conflict with China.179  But when it was 
clear that Japan would be the victor of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan annexed the island 
on the basis that the island was terra nullius. 
Now Dokdo, which had been recognized as Korean territory both by Korea and 
Japan, was claimed by Japan as terra nullius.  As was the case about a decade earlier, 
Japan was engaged in another war, this time with Russia, and a train of things happened 
which made Japan use its knowledge about and experience with international law to 
legally take Dokdo from Korea.  
B. THE JAPANESE NAVY IN PERIL 
“Mine warfare proved to be a double edged sword.” 180 In April, it deprived 
Russia’s most energetic and competent Admiral Makarov of life and it toppled the 
Russians’ morale decisively. In May, a similar disaster struck the Japanese Navy. Noting 
that the Japanese vessels were using almost the same daily route outside Port Arthur, 
Captain Ivanov, the commander of the Russian minelayer the Amur, laid mines outside 
the harbor on May 14 under the cover of heavy fog. The next morning, the Japanese 
battleships the Hatsuse (15,200 ton), the Shikishima (14,850 ton) and the Yashima 
(12,517 ton), were patrolling off Port Arthur following their daily pattern.181 First, the 
Hatsuse hit one of the Ivanov’s mines. The Yashima hit one a moment later. In a state of 
confusion, the Hatsuse hit a second mine and, like the Petropavlovsk, sank in less than 
ninety seconds with about 600 crews.182 The Yashima also sank when she was being 
towed by other ships. As a result, the Japanese navy lost one third of its capital ships in a 
day. 
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In addition, the cruiser Yoshino, with a crew of more than 300, sank after being hit 
by the cruiser Kassuga (7,583 ton) in a dense fog. Two days later, the destroyer Akatsuki 
struck another mine and sank. “The series of losses was the cause of much concern at 
Admiral Togo’s headquarters because he had absolutely no reserves in ships or men.”183 
C. THREAT OF THE RUSSIAN VLADIVOSTOK SQUADRON 
Furthermore, in contrast to the passivity at Port Arthur, the Vladivostok cruiser 
squadron with large cruisers, the Gromoboi, the Rossia and the Rurik, under Vice 
Admiral Skrydlov had posed a serious threat since the outbreak of the war and it further 
increased the Japanese concerns. Consequently, after the Russian cruisers’ second 
mission in the late February 1904, the Japanese navy replaced the weak Third Fleet with 
the stronger Second Fleet under Admiral Kamimura Hikonojo to take charge in securing 
the Korean Strait/Tsushima Strait and East Sea/Sea of Japan.184 However, while skillfully 
avoiding a direct engagement with the Japanese Second Fleet, the Russian cruisers 
disturbed the Japanese movements at sea. On March 6 Admiral Kamimura went to 
Vladivostok to ask a fight, but the Russians did not answer.185 Instead, the Russians 
sailed out on April 8 and moved into Japanese waters, where they sank several Japanese 
freighters, including the Kinshu-maru, which were transporting troops and supplies to 
Korea.186 To avenge this, Admiral Kamimura sailed to Vladivostok once again on May 
12, but the Russians did not come out.187  
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On June 12, three Russian cruisers sortied out under the command of Vice 
Admiral Petr Alekseevich Bezobrazov.188 They went to the Korean Strait/Tsushima Strait, 
attacked several Japanese transports and sank three of them, with the loss of 1,095 troops, 
large quantity of ammunitions, railway engines and materials, and, mostly importantly, 
large-caliber howitzers for the siege train at Port Arthur.189 Admiral Kamimura tracked 
and pursued the Russian cruisers, but, again, the Russians escaped under heavy rain and 
darkness. At this juncture, the anxiety and discontent of the Japanese public opinion 
focused on Admiral Kamimura: his house in Tokyo was stoned by a mob; politicians 
demanded his court-martial; some sent short swords, calling for his suicide.190  
On June 30, the Russians sortied out again. This time the Russian five torpedo 
boats entered the harbor of Gensan while the three cruisers were sighted in the offing. 
The torpedo boats shelled Gensan, sank several Japanese vessels, and returned without 
being interrupted by the Japanese.191 
On July 20, the Russian cruisers under Rear Admiral Karl Petrovich Issen sortied 
out and boldly sailed through Tsugaru Strait and appeared in Tokyo Bay. They sank or 
captured and released several Western merchantmen and sank some Japanese supply 
vessels.192 On July 30, the Russians returned to Vladivostok through the Tsugaru Strait, 
but, again, Admiral Kamimura missed the Russians.  
The Japanese navy had already started suffering from the shortage of vessels, lost 
one third of its capital ships and several vessels since May 1904 and the communication 
of the Japanese in the East Sea/Sea of Japan was at crises. However, despite the 
passiveness of the Russians at Port Arthur, Admiral Togo could not neglect them and 
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move his fleet to secure the communication line in the East Sea/Sea of Japan, where the 
Russian cruisers at Vladivostok became more bold and vigorous in terrifying the 
Japanese line of communication. In the end, as a defensive measure, Japan began 
building observation posts along the Korean coast line. Indeed, this job had already 
started since June 1904.  
D. JAPANESE CONSTRUCTION OF OBSERVATION POSTS193 
On May 18, 1904, three days after the catastrophe of the Japanese battleships the 
Hatsuse and the Yoshima, the Korean government, under Japanese pressure, announced 
that it would nullify all the treaties it had signed with Russia, including those regarding 
timber rights on the Yalu and Tumen Rivers and on Ulleungdo. 194  After the 
announcement, all the Russians in Ulleungdo were vanquished by force. When the idea 
of depriving Russia of its influence on Korea was first discussed in March, Ulleungdo 
was not included in the initial draft. However, after losing two capital battleships and 
other vessels, the Japanese government added Ulleungdo to the document. This was 
because the Japanese naval ministry wanted to compensate for its weakened naval power 
by locating of the Russian Vladivostok fleet’s operational movements more quickly.  
On June 21, 1904, the Japanese navy ordered that observation posts with radio 
communication facilities be built at Chukpyon in Uljin County and other strategically 
important points along the eastern and southern coast of Korea.195 The construction at 
Chukpyon began on June 27, 1904, was completed on July 22, and began operation on  
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August 10.196 In addition, on July 5, 1904, the Japanese navy decided to construct two 
observation posts at Ulleungdo, one each at the northwest and southeast ends, and 
connect Chukpyon and Ulleungdo by submarine cable.197  
The construction of the two observation posts on Ulleungdo was started on 
August 3, 1904, and completed on September 1, and operations began on the following 
day.198 The laying of the undersea cables began on September 8 and was completed on 
the 25th of the month.199 With the undersea cable, the observation post at Ulleungdo 
could report its observations of the Russian fleet to Japanese navy headquarters in Sasebo 
in Japan by way of Chukpyon.200 Overall, the Japanese navy erected a total of twenty 
observation posts on Wonsan, Cheju, Ulsan, Cholyoungdo, Keomundo, Hongdo, and Udo, 
all along the Korean coast.201 
As Figure 6 and Table 1 show, the Japanese navy had only two observation posts, 
Palgupo in southwest of Korea and Baekryungdo in the Yellow Sea.  However, since the 
late June 1904, the number of the Japanese navy’s observation posts promptly increased. 
It implies that the Japanese navy was seriously concerned about the command of the sea 
which was caused by the loss of its one third of capital ships and several warships and 
threatened by the Russian Vladivostok fleet; recognized the need to reinforce the 
Kamimura’s cruiser fleet; and, thus, tried to offset these problems by early locating the 
Russian vessels. Furthermore, additional construction of observation posts after the Battle 
of the East Sea/Sea of Japan reaffirms how the Japanese thought about the importance of 
those islands and how they were going to be used: the complete containment of the 
Russian fleet in Vladivostok, just in case.  
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Figure 6.   Japanese Construction of Observations Posts along Korean Coastline202 
                                                 














Flag, Flash signal, 
Wireless 




04. 3. 17 04. 4. 3 04. 4. 11 19 
Chukpyon Telegram Wireless 04. 6. 27 04. 7. 22 04. 8. 10 13 
Wonsan Telephone Flag, Flash Signal 04. 7. 5 04. 8. 3 04. 8. 3 5 
Busan Telegram Perfection 04. 7. 17 04. 8. 2 04. 8. 2 9 
Hongdo Telegram Perfection 04. 7. 17 04. 8. 2 04. 10. 7 8 
Ulleungdo Telephone Perfection 04. 8. 3 04. 9. 1 04. 9. 2 7 
Ulleungdo Telegram Perfection 04. 8. 3 04. 9. 1 04. 9. 2 7 




04. 8. 27 04. 9. 20 04. 9. 30 11 




04. 8. 27 04. 9. 20 04. 9. 30 12 




04. 9. 5 04. 10. 18 04. 11. 29 8 
















05. 7. 14 05. 8. 15 05. 8. 21 8 
Dokdo Telephone Perfection 05. 7. 25 05. 8. 19 05. 8. 19 6 
Table 1.   Japanese Construction of Observation Posts along Korean Coastline203  
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E. A JAPANESE FISHERMAN’S REQUEST FOR THE INCORPORATION 
OF DOKDO 
While the Japanese navy was in a hurry to construct observation posts at strategic 
points along the Korean coast, including Ulleungdo, a Japanese fisherman named Nakai 
Yozaburo (中井養三郞) from Shimane prefecture went to Tokyo. Nakai was engaging in 
fisheries by using diving apparatus, which was a new concept at the time. He caught sea 
cucumbers off Vladivostok from 1891 to 1892 and hunted sea lions on and off the coasts 
of Korea in 1893. In 1903, he found that Dokdo was a lucrative habitat of sea lions. 
Knowing that Dokdo was Korean territory, Nakai went Tokyo to meet high-ranking 
Japanese officials in 1904 and to ask help with his plan to petition the Korean 
government, not the Japanese government, for a monopoly on fishing rights at Dokdo. 
In Tokyo, Nakai met government officials through an official of the Japanese 
Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce named Fujita Kantaro from the same hometown 
Oki. When Nakai explained his plan for Dokdo, Maki Bokushin, director of the Fishery 
Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, influenced him to think that Dokdo 
might not be Korean territory. So he decided to ask the Hydrographic Office in the 
Ministry of the Navy what the status of Dokdo was. When Nakai met Kimotsuke 
Kaneyuki (肝付兼行), Director of the Hydrographic office in the Ministry of the Navy, 
and asked the status of Dokdo, the director answered that there was no clear evidence 
concerning the title of Dokdo. He also added that Japan is closer to Dokdo than Korea 
and it would be better to incorporate Dokdo, given that there was a Japanese national, 
Nakai, who was engaging in business on Dokdo.204 Consequently, on September 29, 
1904, Nakai filed a petition entitled “Request for Territorial Incorporation of Liancourt 
Island and Its Lease” to three Japanese Ministries: Home Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and 
Agriculture and Commerce. 
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When Nakai submitted the request, an official, Inoue (井上),205 of the Home 
Ministry said that Nakai’s request would be rejected, despite Nakai’s urging and begging 
the necessity for business. Nakai recollected the time that:  
The Home Ministry authorities had the opinion that the gains would be 
extremely small while the situation would become grave if the acquisition 
of a barren islet suspected of being Korean territory at this point of time 
(during the Russo-Japanese War) should amplify the suspicions of various 
foreign countries that Japan has an ambition to annex Korea. Thus, my 
petition was rejected.206 
Thinking that he could not turn back, Nakai went to the Foreign Ministry and met 
the then Director of Political affairs Yamaza Enjiro (山座圓次郞).207 Yamaza Enjiro’s 
answer was totally different to that of the Home Ministry official. Nakai recollected that: 
Yamaza Enjiro.  . .said the incorporation was urgent particularly under the 
present situation, and it is absolutely necessary and advisable to construct 
observation posts and install wireless or undersea cable and keep watch 
on the hostile warships. Particularly in terms of diplomacy, he told me, not 
to worry about the Home Ministry view. He urged me in high spirits to 
refer the application speedily to the Foreign Ministry. In this way, 
Takeshima was incorporated into our country’s territory.208 
After completing the construction of observation posts on Ulleungdo, the 
Japanese navy dispatched the warship Niitaka-maru to survey the island of Dokdo in 
order to check the feasibility to install an observation post there. This occurred on 
September 24, 1904, five days before Nakai submitted his request to the three Japanese 
ministries. The Niitaka-maru first went to Ulleungdo, where its crewmen interviewed  
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several Japanese workers who had watched Dokdo while they were laying undersea 
cables between Chukpyon and Ulleungdo. The operational logbook of Niitaka-maru 
wrote that: 
Information from who had seen Liancodo (Dokdo) from Matsushima 
(Ulleungdo). 
Liancodo is referred to Dokdo (獨島) by Korean and ‘Liancodo’ by the 
Japanese fishermen…There are three springs around the south of the 
island in point “B,” these are abundant in water, thus, do not get dry whole 
year209…This year the fishermen in Matsushima voyaged to the island 
several times. On June 17, they actually had seen three Russian military 
ships anchoring near the island for a while and sailed to northwest.210 
Here rise the following questions: “Was Dokdo ownerless at that time?” “Did the 
Japanese not know that Dokdo was Korean territory?” and “Did Nakai made the 
application for incorporation of Dokdo by himself?”  
First, Dokdo was not ownerless, but was already Korean territory. Some Japanese 
scholars, such as Simozo Masao, have argued that Sokdo was not Dokdo, but another 
island, when the Korean Emperor formally incorporated it into Korean jurisdiction by 
promulgating Imperial Ordinance No. 41 in October 1900.211 But the Niitaka-maru’s 
logbook clearly shows that the Korean people knew of the existence of Dokdo, used the 
name Dokdo correctly, and went to the island for fishing, and furthermore, that the 
Japanese also knew these facts. 
Second, most people related to this process knew or thought that Dokdo was 
Korean territory. Nakai, who thought that Dokdo was Korean territory, went to Tokyo to 
get some help for his petition to the Korean government, via the Japanese government, 
for a monopoly on fishing in Dokdo. However, Maki Bokushin, director of the Fishery 
                                                 
209 This report exaggerated the amount of water in Dokdo; in fact, it is really difficult to get water on 
the island. It implies that the captain of the ship exaggerated the fact, knowing that the Japanese navy so 
urgently needed to build a military facility there. 
210 The Operational Logbook of the Niitaka-maru (September 24, 1904), quoted in Kim, The Plunder 
of Dokdo by the Japanese Military, 93-94. 
211 Kim, The Japanese Arguments on Dokdo, 162-168. 
 63
Bureau of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce, influenced Nakai to change his 
thought to the opposite. But Maki must have known the fact that Dokdo was Korean 
territory, given that he wrote the preface of Guidelines for the Fishery in Korean Sea 
(韓海統漁指針) in 1903, which stated that ‘Liancodo’ was subjected to Kangwon 
Province, Korea. Indeed, Inoue, an official in Home Ministry, who had been well familiar 
with the inside story of the Home Ministry’s decision before and after the Meiji 
Restoration concerning the Dokdo issue, rejected Nakai’s application. In addition, 
Kimotsuke Kaneyuki (肝付兼行), Director of the Hydrographic Office in the Ministry of 
the Navy, must have known that Dokdo was Korean territory. The Hydrographic Office 
of the Ministry of the Navy, where he had been working for a long time, had published 
The Sea Lanes of the World (Kanei suiroshi, 1886), 212  and The Korean Sea Lanes 
(Chosen suiroshi, 1899),213 which precisely described Dokdo as well as Ulleungdo as 
Korean territory. One may assume that Kimotsuke Kaneyuki might have not known the 
status of Dokdo when he convinced Nakai that Dokdo was not Korean territory. But he 
was the recipient of the report from the Niitaka-maru, which, at the least, should have 
been enough to make him suspicious about the sovereignty of Dokdo. But he did not try 
to check the sovereignty of Dokdo. Instead, the report, which mentioned the Russian 
ships’ anchoring near Dokdo, must have inspired him to promote the incorporation of 
Dokdo. Yamaza Enjiro, then the Director of Political Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, had 
worked for a long time at the Japanese legation in Korea before he took office in the 
Foreign Ministry. Therefore, it is highly probable that he realized Dokdo was Korean 
territory when he faced disputes between Korea and Japan concerning illegal Japanese 
fisheries and lumbering in Ulleungdo, the Korean government’s consequent 
redevelopment of Dokdo, and the Korean Emperor’s official jurisdiction over Ulleungdo  
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and Dokdo. However, his response to Nakai’s application seems to have reflected the 
Japanese desire for a chance to use Dokdo for military purposes.  
Third, it is questionable whether the idea to apply for incorporation of Dokdo was 
made by Nakai by himself. Kawakami Kenzo, who was an important figure when Dokdo 
became a diplomatic issue between the two countries, argued that the incorporation of 
Dokdo was merely to approve Nakai’s monopolistic fishery.214 However, the Japanese 
government did not necessarily need to incorporate Dokdo to give Nakai a monopoly in 
Dokdo. This is because Japanese fishermen, including Nakai, had already been enjoying 
a free fishery in the sea near Korea, based on the agreements of 1883 and 1889 between 
Korea and Japan. In addition, in July 1904, Japan expanded its fishing rights not only in 
the East Sea, but also in the Yellow Sea.215 Moreover, the Japanese, which single-
handedly controlled the Korean administration, could merely notify the Korean 
government that it was giving a monopoly to Nakai if it wanted to.  
If the Japanese government wanted to incorporate Dokdo only for a single 
fisherman, it might have asked the Korean government the status of Dokdo before 
incorporating it; if the Korean government answered that Dokdo was Korean territory, 
the only thing the Japanese government could do would be to just reject Nakai’s 
application. However, the Japanese government did not do any of the options discussed 
above; instead, as will be discussed later, it incorporated Dokdo secretly. This implies 
that the Japanese government did not want to let the Korean government know what was 
happening to Dokdo. It is also questionable whether Nakai prepared the petition by 
himself. Considering the circumstances before and after his application, it would be a 
reasonable conclusion that he prepared it with the help of Japanese officials. 
In sum, the author concludes that the Japanese incorporated Dokdo even though 
they knew for a fact that Dokdo was Korean territory. When the Japanese navy was 
building observation posts along the Korean coastline and considering the use of Dokdo 
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for military purposes, Nakai went to Tokyo to ask for a monopoly for catching sea lions 
in the vicinity of Dokdo. Maki Bokushin and Kimotsuke Kaneyuki falsely informed 
Nakai that Dokdo was not Korean territory and incited him to petition for incorporation 
of Dokdo. While Nakai was preparing for the petition, probably with help from Japanese 
officials, the Japanese navy sent the Niitaka-maru to survey Dokdo in September. An 
official in the  Home Ministry, who knew the inside history of Dokdo, rejected Nakai’s 
application, but Yamaza Enjiro urged Nakai to send it to the Foreign Ministry while 
emphasizing the strategic importance of Dokdo.  
In the end, the Japanese navy’s idea of using Dokdo for military purposes 
materialized. In November 1904, the Japanese Navy deployed a warship, the Tsushima-
maru, to Dokdo for the purpose of surveying suitable locations for the construction of 
communication posts (not a communication station).216 The Tsushima-maru arrived at 
Dokdo on December 20, 1904, and some officers looked around it for about three hours. 
They reported that they had found some appropriate places for constructing observation 
posts on Dokdo. They also reported their concern that the lack of water would be a 
problem and that water would need to be supplied from outside after the construction of 
observation posts.217  
The Japanese navy wanted to build an observation post quickly on Dokdo. 
However, due to the harsh winter weather, the Japanese navy had to postpone the 
construction of an observation post on Dokdo until the next year; in fact, construction 
started in July, 1905, after the Battle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan. 
F. THE JAPANESE INCORPORATION OF DOKDO 
As discussed before, it was September 29, 1904 when Nakai Yozaburo petitioned 
for a monopoly on catching sea lions in Dokdo, and it was an Japanese official, Inoue (井
上), in the Home Ministry who rejected Nakai’s request. However, it was Yoshikawa 
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Akimasa (芳川顯正), then the Japanese Home Minister, who sent a secret notice to the 
then Japanese Prime Minister, Katsura Taro (桂太郞), asking to hold a cabinet meeting 
to discuss “A Case Concerning an Uninhabited Island (Munintoshozoku ni kansuru ken)” 
in January 10, 1905.218 This was at the time when Admiral Togo was staying in Tokyo 
(December 30, 1904 ~ February 6, 1905) while conferring with the Naval General Staff 
to discuss operational plan to meet the Baltic Fleet.219 It was decided that the East 
Sea/Sea of Japan would be the final battlefield between the two countries’ navies; 
Ulleungdo and Dokdo lie in the middle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan.  
On January 28, at a cabinet meeting of the Prime Minister, Navy Minister and 
eleven other ministers, the decision was made to incorporate Dokdo as Japanese territory. 
The written conclusion reads that:  
An examination of the case concerning the uninhabited island located in 
lat. 37˚9´30˝, long. 131˚55´E, 85 ri 220  northwest from Okinoshima 
concludes that the island has no traces of ownership by any country… 
Documents clearly attest to a man known as Nakai Yozaburo having been 
emigrated to these islands and pursued the occupation of fishing, proof 
according to international law of occupation and hence evidence of 
Japanese jurisdiction. Therefore, we the cabinet have filed the decision to 
make these islands subordinate to the Oki Islands Branch Office of 
Shimane Prefecture.221 
On February 22, 1905, the governor of Shimane Prefecture announced “Shimane 
Prefectural Notice No. 40,” which placed Dokdo under the jurisdiction of the Okinoshima 
branch of the Shimane Prefectural Government.222 For this, the Japanese government 
stated: 
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In January 1905, through a Cabinet Decision, the Japanese government 
reaffirmed its intention to possess Takeshima, stipulated that the islands 
would come under the jurisdiction of the Okinoshima branch of the 
Shimane Prefectural Government, and officially named the islands as 
“Takeshima.”223 
The Japanese statement shows that Dokdo was incorporated on the basis of 
“occupation” of “terra nullius.” It is true that Dokdo was uninhabited. But, it was 
common sense at that time that Dokdo belonged to Kangwon Province, Korea, and most 
Japanese officials who were involved in the case must have known the fact. Moreover, it 
is questionable when the Japanese government affirmed its intention to possess Dokdo 
before reaffirming it by incorporating Dokdo. In fact, Japan had never affirmed its 
intention to possess Dokdo, but had at least twice officially confirmed its intention of 
accepting Korean sovereignty over it in 1696 and 1877.224 The Korean government 
confirmed its sovereignty over Dokdo in October 1900 by promulgating “Imperial 
Ordinance No. 41,” and this fact was widely announced by the government’s official 
gazette. 
The Japanese exaggerated Nakai’s fishery in Dokdo as an occupation.  It was also 
not true that Nakai “emigrated” to Dokdo. In fact, Nakai went to Dokdo between April 
and August to catch sea lions, and stayed on the island only for “ten days per each time at 
an interim place.”225 
If Dokdo was terra nullius and incorporated by Japan at that time, it is also 
contradictory to the current Japanese government’s arguments that Dokdo is “an inherent 
part of the territory of Japan.”226 If Dokdo was Japanese territory, why did the Japanese 
government argue that “the island has no traces of ownership by any country?”227  
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The Japanese government further argues that: 
Having received the request from Nakai, the government of Japan, hearing 
opinions from Shimane Prefecture, confirmed that there is no problem in 
bringing Takeshima under the jurisdiction of the Okinoshima branch and 
that “Takeshima” is the appropriate name for the islands. With this 
confirmation, the government, in January 1905, through the Cabinet 
decision, stipulated that the islands came under the jurisdiction of the 
Okinoshima branch of Shimane Prefectural Government, and that the 
islands were officially named as “Takeshima.” This decision was 
conveyed to the Governor of Shimane Prefecture by the Minister for 
Home Affairs.228 
However, as discussed before, there was a problem: Japan knew that Dokdo was 
Korean territory. The Shimane Prefecture, where the Japanese government asked for an 
opinion about the issue, must have known that Dokdo was Korean territory, because this 
Prefecture, in 1877, had already asked to the Meiji government whether it should include 
Dokdo into its jurisdictional area; it had received the answer from Dajokan that the island 
“had nothing to do with Japan” and therefore excluded it from its jurisdiction. 
Moreover, if Dokdo had not been terra nullius before Japan mistakenly 
incorporated it and Japan then found out that Dokdo was Korean inherent territory, Japan 
could not claim to possess Dokdo. Indeed, the Japanese government should have 
acknowledged its mistake and renounced its claim over Dokdo. But, Japan did not do so. 
The Japanese government further argues that:  
Based on the Cabinet Decision and the Ministerial Instruction from the 
Minister for Home Affairs, the Governor of Shimane Prefecture published 
in February 1905 that Takeshima was officially named as “Takeshima” 
and that it came under the jurisdiction of the Okinoshima branch. He also 
informed the Okinoshima branch to this effect. These measures were 
carried in the newspapers of the day and were broadly publicized.229 
The Korean government officially affirmed its incorporation of Dokdo through its 
official gazette in October 1900. In contrast, the Japanese did not officially announce its 
                                                 
228 Japan, MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/takeshima/incorporation.html (accessed 
May 28, 2007). 
229 Ibid. 
 69
incorporation of Dokdo. Instead, the fact was printed in a local newspaper, not in a 
governmental gazette. The “Shimane Prefectural Public Notice No. 40” was circulated 
inside the office, and the Japanese government did not officially announce its 
incorporation of Dokdo.230 It was customary in Japan at that time for local governments 
to announce the incorporation of an island, but, in 1876, when the Japanese government 
incorporated Ogasawara islands, it compromised with the United States and Great Britain 
several times and announced its incorporation to the United States and twelve European 
countries.231 Other examples indicating that the incorporation of Dokdo was not broadly 
announced can also be found in other sources. After the battle of the East Sea/Sea of 
Japan, which will be discussed later, Ulleungdo and Dokdo became famous places when 
several Japanese newspapers delivered news of the victory of the East Sea/Sea of 
Japan.232 However, the secrecy of the incorporation of Dokdo was revealed once again. 
These newspapers still referred Dokdo as “Liancodo,” not as “Takeshima.”233 Another 
example is found in Official Gazette No. 6777, published on September 9, 1905, entitled 
“The Present State of Choson (Korean) Ulleungdo.”234 Based on a report by Japanese 
counsel Ariyoshi Akira (有吉明) at Pusan, Korea, it says that “Sea lions live in 
“Liancodo” south east 25 ri from Ulleungdo.” This report shows that even the Japanese 
diplomat did not know the facts about the incorporation of Dokdo. 
Finally, the Korean government did not know this fact until 1906, when Japanese 
officials went to Ulleungdo and told a Korean official, Sim Hung-Taek, who was in 
charge of Ulleungdo and Dokdo, about their survey of Dokdo. He rapidly notified the 
central government of this absurd situation, and it was reported in the Korean Daily News 
on May 1, 1906. 
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Unusually strange things are happening. Ulleungdo County Chief Sim 
Hung-Taek reported to the Home Ministry that a party of Japanese 
government officials came to Ulleungdo and professed that Dokdo 
belonging to Ulleungdo was not Japanese territory, and took record of the 
topography, population and land size, etc. The Home Ministry sent a 
directive saying that it is strange for them to record the population of other 
country while on an excursion, and as their claim to Dokdo as Japanese 
territory is totally groundless, the story is really shocking.235 
Again, the report of Sim Hung-Take clearly shows that the Korean government 
had been practicing its sovereign right over Dokdo at that time. The Korean government, 
newspapers, and intellectuals protested that the Japanese behavior was illegal. 236 
However, Korea could do nothing because Korean had already become a protectorate of 
Japan by signing the second Korean-Japanese Agreement in November 1905. 
Here rises another question: Why had the Japanese secretly incorporated Dokdo? 
First, knowing that Dokdo was reaffirmed as Korea territory in 1900, the Japanese 
government did not want the Korean government to know about the incorporation, 
because it worried about a strong protest from the Korean government. Second, the 
Japanese government did not want other countries to know of its incorporation of Dokdo. 
This is because, as a Japanese Home Ministry official cautioned, the incorporation of 
Dokdo might provoke other countries to worry that Japan might have a suspicious 
ambition toward Korea. If other countries, especially the United States and Great Britain, 
checked and pressed Japan, it could not get more loans from those countries to fight the 
war. Third, Japan wanted to use Dokdo secretly to observe the movement of Russian 
ships. If this became public, Russia, especially the Russian navy, might know of it and 
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V. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 
A. THE JAPANESE ADVANCE TO MUKDEN 
 
Figure 7.   The Japanese Advance to Mukden and Port Arthur237  
After the loss of the Battle of Nanshan, Viceroy Alekseev pressed General 
Kuropatkin to relieve Port Arthur. But Kuropatkin refused on the basis that Port Arthur 
could withstand the Japanese assault. Indeed, the General’s essential concern was the 
“infelicitous combination” which involved “decisive defeats,” “questionable battlefield 
performance” of his troops, and “an unexpectedly tough and highly motivated enemy” 
which critically undermined the Russians’ morale.238 Eventually, Kuropatkin followed 
the viceroy’s order and sent in the Siberian Army Corps under Lieutenant General G.K. 
Shtakelberg. The Russians fought hard against the Japanese Second Army at Tellissu 
from June 15 to June 16, 1904, but finally lost the battle due to the lack of close  
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coordination between the leaders and poor intelligence regarding Japanese operational 
maneuvers.  The Russians retreated, which further consolidated the isolation of Port 
Arthur. 
Meanwhile, Field-Marshal Oyama Iwao (大山巌) was appointed as Commander-
in-Chief to coordinate all the Japanese ground battles in Manchuria. He arrived at the 
Second Army’s base on July 22, 1904.239 In July, the Japanese army enjoyed continuous 
victories in small battles and advanced to Liaoyang where three Japanese armies—First, 
Second, and Third—combined and fought together to defeat the Russians. 
At Liaoyang, General Kuropatkin prepared a three phase defense plan to meet the 
Japanese. Kuropatkin’s plan was to gradually retreat from each highly fortified defense 
line while fatiguing the Japanese, and then execute a final decisive counterattack. In the 
first phase of battle on August 22, facing the unprecedented strong resistance from the 
Russians, the Japanese went into disarray and retired, but Kuropatkin merely retreated 
according to the plan and thus lost the first opportunity to defeat the enemy; Kuropatkin 
did not know that his troops outnumbered the Japanese by 158,000 to 125,000.240 The 
second phase of battle started on August 25 and continued until the night of August 30-31. 
Again, not knowing his advantage in numbers, Kuropatkin retreated and lost his second 
opportunity to defeat the enemy and change the tide of the war.241 After the second 
retreat, as preplanned, Kuropatkin planned to counterattack. But his plan was discovered 
by the Japanese: they had obtained a precious position, called Manju-yama, which the 
Russians had carelessly ignored during their retreat, and which enabled the Japanese to 
see the Russians movements. Consequently, in the third phase of the battle on September 
2-3, despite Kuropatkin’s strenuous efforts, the Russians finally lost the battle and 
retreated further north to Mukden.242 The battle was highly costly to both belligerents.  
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The Russians suffered 16,000 casualties, and the Japanese, 23,000.243 It was clear that the 
Japanese won the battle, but they failed to rout the retreating Russians, for they were also 
fatigued.  
In contrast to the Japanese military’s increasing difficulties in supporting their 
troops as they advanced to the north, Russia’s situation improved. After facing the series 
of dishonorable defeats the tsar had started sending his best troops, and the opening of a 
railway round Lake Baikal further eased the Russians’ supply difficulties. However, 
Kuropatkin became increasingly concerned about the worsening situation of Port Arthur, 
knowing that it will fall unless it was relieved by land.244  
Finally, Kuropatkin launched another counterattack, and the Battle of Sha-Ho 
began on October 11.245 In the battle, which lasted for about one week, the Russians lost 
about 11,000 killed or missing, 30,000 wounded, while the Japanese lost about 4,000 
killed and 16,000 wounded.246 Even though the Russians claimed that they won the battle, 
the numbers of casualties told the truth, and they could not deny that Port Arthur could 
not be relieved. The Japanese also knew that they had barely avoided being defeated, and 
that a shortage of ammunition and troops was preventing them from expanding their war 
result. In the end, the Russians and the Japanese, both suffering from the harsh winter and 
fatigued after the continuous battles did not ask to fight until the beginning of 1905. 
B. THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE RUSSIAN FIRST SQUADRON  
The Russian First Squadron became almost as it had been before the outbreak of 
the war when the Retvizan and other damaged ships became seaworthy as of May 
1904.247 The loss of the Petropavlovsk was irrecoverable, but the Japanese loss of two 
capital ships, the Hatsuse and the Yashima, was enough to offset the Russian loss. Even 
more, in terms of the number of battleships, the Russians were superior to the Japanese 
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by six to four. As long as Port Arthur was isolated and the Japanese envelopment 
tightened, it would have been much better for the Russians to put out to sea and seek a 
decisive general war, or to combine with the cruiser squadron in Vladivostok, than to 
wait for the destruction of the fleet without doing anything. Therefore, Admiral Alekseev, 
the Viceroy, had been urging Vitgeft to go to sea since June 1904. 
After the three times of order from Alekseev to sortie out to sea, finally, Vitgeft 
weighed anchor and put out to sea on June 23, 1904.248 Six tugs dragging U-shaped mine 
sweeps followed four destroyers with the same mission. Eight destroyers followed the 
sweeping ships, and four cruisers and six battleships formed the main body, with four 
destroyers and two gunboats behind them.249 When he learned that the Russians had 
sortied out, Admiral Togo was surprised because his Fleet was not ready and was 
separated throughout the Yellow Sea. 250  Admiral Togo managed to assemble four 
battleships, eight cruisers, and a dozen destroyers to face the Russians. However, Admiral 
Togo was lucky, because, despite his advantage in numbers, Vitgeft turned back to Port 
Arthur and lost the last chance to make for Vladivostok. 
After that Vitgeft denied the viceroy’s orders several times251 until the viceroy 
sent his final message which “threatened Admiral Vitgeft with court-martial and the other 
officers with dishonor.”252 In the end, Vitgeft reluctantly left Port Arthur again on August 
10, 1904, just before the Japanese Third Army’s general assault began. But Admiral Togo 
was ready this time. However, Admiral Togo did not want to risk his capital ships, 
because he needed to preserve his fleet to meet the Russian Second Squadron. Meanwhile, 
the sole purpose of Vitgeft was to flee to Vladivostok without engaging in a decisive 
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battle. Thanks to Togo’s cautiousness and his mistake in maneuvering, the Russian First 
Squadron seemed to have escaped from the Japanese pursuit by mid-afternoon. But, by 
using his fleet’s advantageous speed, Togo managed to catch up, and the battle resumed. 
While each side hit the mark, and the Russians seemed to be able to hide in 
darkness, two subsequent twelve-inch shells hit the Russian flagship, the Tsesarevich. 
These killed Vitgeft and his staff and helmsman and it caused the Tsesarevich to swing 
into a tight one circle turn to port.253 The ships following barely averted a collision, but 
the formation disintegrated. Admiral Ukhtomski, the second in command who was 
aboard the Peresvyet, signaled that he had taken command and the ships should follow 
him. But since his battleship had lost its masts, his signal was posted low and did not 
deliver his order to other ships clearly. Admiral Togo took advantage of the Russians’ 
confusion and tried to drive them back to Port Arthur.  
In the end, most of the separated First Squadron returned to Port Arthur on 
August 11. Four battleships out of the five, the Poltava, the Peresviet, the Pobieda, and 
Retvizan, one first class cruiser, the Pallada, and three of the eight destroyers returned to 
Port Arthur.254 The Japanese navy did not sink any of the Russian ships, but the Russians 
would never come out to fight the Japanese again. Captain RN Viren replaced Vitgeft: 
after surveying his situation, including ships, guns, and ammunition, concluded not to 
sortie anymore, choosing instead to wait for the Second Squadron while supporting the 
ground troops during the Japanese siege attacks.255 Consequently, he transferred 284 
guns from the ships to the forts.256  
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Figure 8.   The Battle of the Yellow Sea257  
Meanwhile, the three Russian cruisers, the Gromoboi, the Rossia and the Rurik, 
left Vladivostok on August 13 to assist their comrades at Port Arthur without knowing 
that their counterparts at Port Arthur had turned back. On August 14, at dawn, while they 
were waiting near Busan on the southeast coast of Korea for their comrades from Port 
Arthur, they encountered four of Kamimura’s cruisers. The Russians turned back, but 
Kamimura chased them. Soon, two additional Japanese cruisers joined the battle. The 
Russian sailors showed their splendid fighting abilities and courage, but, finally, Admiral 
Kamimura succeeded in avenging his humiliation and dishonor for the past several 
months: the Rurik was sunk and the other two were badly damaged and barely managed 
to return to Vladivostok.258 After two months, the two cruisers became seaworthy but, 
again, the Gromoboi ran aground on a rock and became useless. The only cruiser left, the 
Rossia, could not do anything except wait for the Russian Second Fleet.259 In the end, the 
Russian First Squadron in the Far East became nothing; its existence posed no threat to 
the Japanese navy.  
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C. THE FALL OF PORT ARTHUR 
General Nogi asked the Russians to surrender on August 16, but the Russians 
refused, and on August 19, the Japanese assault started.260 However, the fortification of 
Port Arthur was so strong that the Japanese could not acquire good results. By August 24, 
Japanese casualties reached 16,000, so General Nogi stopped his assault for almost a 
month.261 By the end of September, General Nogi received more weapons for assaulting 
the port, including eighteen 11-inch howitzers which could destroy any reinforced 
Russian fortifications with their 550-pound shells. 262  The howitzers were not very 
accurate, the Japanese could not see the results of their attack, and the continuous 
movement of the Russian ships made it difficult to hit them by shelling. Nogi’s 
continuous attempt to destroy the Russians’ fortified defenses failed again and again, and 
the possibility of the Japanese capturing the harbor before the arrival of the Russian 
Second Fleet did not seem high. Even more, as long as the Russian First Squadron 
remained intact, Admiral Togo could not leave Port Arthur and prepare to meet the 
Russian Second Fleet. In November, the Japanese became nervous when they learned that 
the Russian Squadron was passing Africa, because they still had not succeeded in 
occupying Port Arthur by land or by sea.263 However, as of December 5, the situation 
changed after the Japanese captured 203-Meter Hill, known the Russians as Vysokaya 
(High), which was located west of Port Arthur; this provided them a clear overlook of the 
situation of the harbor.264 The Japanese losses to get the hill were tragic,265 but having 
the advantage of the hill clearly heightened the efficiency of the Japanese attack to Port 
Arthur. 
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When the Japanese captured 203-Metre Hill, telephone messages from its 
summit directed the fire of heavy siege-guns in protected places, so that 
the gunners made untenable a city and harbor which they could not see. 
The Japanese fleet added to the pandemonium of ruin. Admiral Togo… by 
having  tiny torpedo-boats, which the Russians found it difficult to see and 
almost impossible to hit, lie several miles from off shore, and by wireless 
dispatches gave the range and a report on each shot to gunners on the 
battleships lying safely out of reach of the Russian forts.266 
As a result, the Japanese siege guns destroyed all the Russian battleships one by 
one except the Sevastopol.267 After the fall of 203-Meter Hill, Lieutenant General Baron 
A. M. Stessel, who was in charge of Port Arthur, opened a council of war. The majority 
of the Russian officers favored holding out and Stessel “ostensibly accepted the majority 
opinion,” for he had already notified the tsar that “the fall of Port Arthur was 
imminent.”268  In the end, on January 1, 1905, General Stessel surrendered to General 
Nogi. The surrender was signed on January 2, 1905.269 By this, the Japanese Third Army 
became free and could join the other armies in the Battle of Mukden, and Admiral Togo 
could start preparing to fight the Russian Second Squadron. From the Russians’ 
perspective, the First Squadron was completely destroyed, and the Second Squadron lost 
its destination; General Kuropatkin’s pressure to fight the enemy had increased.  
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D. THE BATTLE OF MUKDEN 
 
Figure 9.   The Battle of Mukden270  
Now the focus moves on to the last major land battle in the war. “Mukden was not 
only the greatest battle of the war, but was one of the greatest battles of history in which a 
million men engaged on a fighting-line nearly a hundred miles long and fought for 
seventeen successive days (February 24-March12).”271 
After relieving Port Arthur, General Nogi’s Third Army joined with other armies 
under Field Marshall Oyama. Meanwhile, Oyama established the Fifth Army under 
General Kawamura, so Japan was ready for the fight with five armies.272 The west of the 
battle area was plains, but the east of it was mountainous. The Japanese Third, Second, 
Reserve, Fourth, First, and Fifth Armies were disposed in that order roughly from west to 
east.  The Third Army was in the rear, southwest of the Second Army. Knowing that the 
eastern mountainous area was hard to fight and advance in, Oyama planned to distract the 
Russians’ attention by opening the battle with the First Army’s attack in the mountainous 
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area, while the Third Army was moving fast to outflank the Russian west.273 On the 
Russian side, after the Battle of Shaho, General Kuropatkin had reorganized his army into 
three field armies, the First, Second, and Third Manchurian Armies, and they were 
arranged with the Second, Third, and First Manchurian Armies from west to east.274 
The Japanese started pressing the Russians on February 17.275 The Japanese were 
outnumbered by the Russians, but their operational plan succeeded in deceiving 
Kuropatkin. Thus, when the Japanese Third Army successfully outflanked the Russians’ 
western flank on March 1, Kuropatkin did not have enough reserve to defend the west.276 
But the Russians succeeded in reinforcing their west on March 2, and then the Japanese 
advanced in the center. By March 4, the battle showed a temporary stalemate, which gave 
Kuropatkin the opportunity to counterattack. But his attack was so straightforward, 
without any deceptive maneuvers that the Japanese easily defended against it.277 By 
March 7, Kuropatkin gave up counter-attacking and made his effort to save Mukden.278 
However, on March 9, under increasing pressure from the Japanese Fourth, First, and 
Fifth Armies’ organized attack, Kuropatkin finally ordered a general retreat to Tiehling, 
40 miles north of Mukden.279 The Japanese armies almost enveloped the Russians, so the 
latter barely escaped from Mukden. The Russians reached Tiehling on March 12. In the 
end, Kuropatkin, thinking that his troops needed more distance from the Japanese, 
torched Tiehling and ordered further retreat to Hsipingkai, 200 miles to the north.280 On 
March 16, 1905, the tsar released Kuropatkin from the Russian Far Eastern Army and 
replaced him by General Linevich.  
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The Battle of Mukden was costly to both sides: the Japanese suffered 70, 000 
casualties while the Russians had 90,000. But, again, despite the winning of the battle, 
the Japanese failed to rout the enemy. That was the end of the major battle in land 
between the two belligerents.  
While the new Russian commander was “watching for an opportunity to turn the 
tide in Manchuria with a decisive battle,” the Japanese military leaders “first recognized 
how critical the situation was.”281  On March 8, 1905, War Minister Seiki Terauchi had 
already asked the American minister in Tokyo, Lloyd C. Griscom, “quite seriously to 
convey to the President his opinion that the time had come when the war should cease 
and that he was quite ready to stop fighting,” while mentioning that “this was his opinion, 
not as a minister of war, but as Seiki Terauchi, a private individual.”282 On March 10, 
President Roosevelt offered to mediate. On March 28, Kodama went to Tokyo to report 
the results of the Battle of Mukden, but his main objective was to ask the emperor to 
move toward peace.283 However, it was clear that the tsar did not want to stop the war 
with dishonor. As of March, the Russian Army was three times larger than the 
Japanese284 and the Second and Third Squadron was sailing to the Far East. Therefore, in 
order to end the war, Japan had to win the final battle in the sea, i.e., the Battle of the East 
Sea/Sea of Japan. 
E. THE BATTLE OF THE EAST SEA/SEA OF JAPAN 
After the successful siege of Port Arthur, Admiral Togo recalled most vessels in 
the Japanese Combined Fleet to the homeland where their crews could have enough time 
to relax, refit, overhaul, and exercise for the upcoming decisive battle of the war: the 
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Battle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan.285 In December 1904, Admiral Togo went to Tokyo 
and consulted with the naval general staff until February about how to meet the Russian 
Second Squadron. One important thing was to predict which course Rozhestvensky’s 
fleet would choose. The Japanese General Staff finally concluded that there would be 
three options for Rozhestvensky. The first was to make for Vladivostok via the Korean 
Straits/Tsushima Straits. The second was to occupy Formosa and use the island as their 
base. The third was to sail around the Japanese east coast and reach Vladivostok from the 
north.286 Admiral Togo and Akiyama Saneyuki, a senior staff officer who was the main 
designer of the battle plan, believed that the Russians would make for Vladivostok.287 
Consequently, Togo selected the East Sea/Sea of Japan as the battlefield and moved his 
base to Jinhae, on the southeast coast of Korea. Togo and Akiyama designed a seven-
stage battle plan that would utilize “both daylight assaults by the heavy units of the fleet 
and night attacks by destroyers and torpedo boats.288 Based on the plan, the Combined 
Fleet engaged in training, including individual and group maneuvers, communications, 
torpedo attacks, and, most importantly, gunnery.289 In addition, the Japanese navy had 
already gained precious experience in Port Arthur and the Yellow Sea. 
In contrast, the Russians were almost completely unprepared for the battle. The 
tsar, Nicholas II, decided to reinforce the Pacific Squadron only after the death of 
Admiral Makarov in April 1904.290 On April 30, the Baltic Fleet was nominated as the 
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Second Squadron, and two days later, Admiral Rozhestvensky was appointed to 
command it,291 but he could not focus on reshaping his fleet because he also had to work 
as the Chief of the General Staff.292 He managed to get his fleet ready for departure in 
months, but the Russian bureaucracy delayed the order again and again. Finally, the 
Second Fleet weighed anchor on October 15, 1904, when the First Squadron in the 
Pacific had already disintegrated in the Battle of Yellow Sea, and Port Arthur, their 
destination, was under siege by the Japanese.  
 
 
Figure 10.   The Voyages of the Russian 2nd and 3rd Pacific Squadron293  
Due to the unfavorable attitude of Great Britain, Rozhestvensky’s main fleet 
would sail around the Cape of Good Hope, Africa. Due to the shortage of coal for the 
journey, despite their legendary 29,000 kilometer voyage with brand new four battleships, 
the Russian ships were unable to engage in sufficient maneuvering and gunnery exercises 
because they had to save coal and ammunition.294 While Japanese spies continuously 
reported the Russians’ position as they sailed around the globe, the Russians did not 
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know of their enemy’s preparations and situation, while barely managing their fleet to 
make for Vladivostok. Furthermore, Rozhestvensky had to waste his precious time 
waiting in Indochina for the newly formed Third Squadron under the command of 
Admiral Nevogatov, which had left Russia on February 15.  All the while, the Japanese 
had more time to relax, exercise, and get ready for action.295  
Rozhestvensky left his colliers at Shanghai, which convinced Togo that the 
Russians would go through the Korean Strait/Tsushima Strait.296 “The coast of Japan was 
lined with signal stations on promontories, islands, and mountain-tops. A wide expanse 
of sea was divided into small numbered squares. Swift torpedo-boats and scout ships 
equipped with wireless telegraph cruised far out at sea, watching night and day.”297 Early 
in the morning of May 27 under heavy fog, Rozhestvensky tried to pass through the 
Korean Strait/Tsushima Strait with his thirty-eight ships with all the lights of the fleet 
dim; however, two hospital ships turned on their bright lights according to the 
international agreement, and these were sighted by the Japanese scout ship the Shinano-
maru.298 Right after receiving the wireless message from the scout ship that “enemy’s 
fleet sighted in square 203,” Admiral Togo weighed anchor for the Korean 
Strait/Tsushima Strait and waited for the enemy.  
In the afternoon, both fleets sighted each other, and around 1400, the battle began. 
But the victor of the battle had already been determined. Japanese gunfire was a lot more 
accurate than the Russians,’ and the Japanese ships were too fast. Klado explained the 
Japanese advantage in speed: 
This difference of two to four knots or so does not at first sight seem very 
great; but if one imagines one fleet motionless and the other moving at 
three knots it is evident that the swifter can place themselves in relation to 
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the other fleet as they please and choose whatever range suits them. Togo 
took every advantage of this superiority in speed and was able to deal with 
ship after ship of the Russian Squadrons as if he had been at target 
practice.299 
With regard to the effectiveness of the Japanese gunnery, a Russian lieutenant 
recollected to Mr. George Kennan that: 
At a distance of four miles the Japanese gunners seemed to hit us with 
almost every shot that they fired. Our men had not had practice enough to 
shoot accurately at such ranges. We hope that we might be able to crowd 
Togo’s ships up toward the land on the Japan side of the strait, and so get 
nearer to them; but they were too fast for us. They circled around ahead of 
us, and knocked us to pieces at such long ranges that we were barely able 
to see them through the mist.”300 
It took only about an hour until the Oslyabya sank at 1510.  Rozhestvensky’s 
flagship was seriously damaged; Rozhestvensky himself was seriously wounded and, 
barely conscious, was moved to the destroyer Buyny.301 When the Japanese lost their 
enemy for a while in the confusion, Admiral Nevogatov took over the command and led 
the fleet to Vladivostok. But soon the Japanese caught up with the Russians and sank the 
Alexander III at 1903 and the Borodino at 1920 pm. After being separated from the main 
body of the fleet, the Suvorov was also sunk at 1920. As it became dark, Admiral Togo 
turned the battle over to the torpedo boats and destroyers and headed directly to 
Ulleungdo, where he planned to fight the next day’s battle as planned by Akiyama.302  
On the morning of May 28, Admiral Nevogatov, onboard his flagship Alexander I, 
surrendered about twenty-eight miles southeast of Dokdo along with the Oryol, the 
Seviani, the Apraxin, and other small ships. 303  Toward dusk on the same day, the  
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destroyer Biedovy, which now carried the unconscious Admiral Rozhestvensky, was 
captured thirty-eight miles southwest of Ulleungdo by a Japanese destroyer, the 
Sazanami.304 
The results of the battle were tragic for Russia. Thirty-four Russian ships out of 
thirty-eight were sunk, scuttled, captured, or interned. The Russians lost 4,830 dead, 
about 6,000 captured including Admirals Rozhestvensky and Nevogatov, and about 2,000 
interned. In contrast, the Japanese lost only three torpedo boats, with 110 men killed and 
590 wounded.305  
The battle allowed the Japanese navy to recognize the strategic importance of the 
islands once again. The observation posts at Ulleungdo were intended to sight the 
Russian Vladivostok Squadron in 1904, but, this time, as Akiyama’s battle plan showed, 
Ulleungdo was also used as an important point in executing the operation. Unfortunately, 
the role of the observation post at Ulleungdo as well as other ones on the Korean coast 
could not be identified since no source could be found. However, the Japanese navy’s 
activity even after completely annihilating the Russian navy will fill the gap caused by 
the secrecy of the Japanese naval war history. 
 
The Loss of the Russian Fleet at the Battle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan 
 Left Baltic Sunk Captured Interned To Vladivostok 
Battleships 8 5 3 0 0 
Cruisers 10 4 1 4 1 
Destroyers 9 5 1 1 2 
Coastal Monitors 3 0 3 0 0 
Repair ships 1 1 0 0 0 
Transports 6 3 0 3 0 
Hospital ships 2 0 2 0 0 
Table 2.   The Loss of the Russian Fleet at the Battle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan306  
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Figure 11.   The Battle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan307 
F. DOKDO AFTER THE BATTLE OF THE EAST SEA/SEA OF JAPAN 
Even after winning the Battle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan, Japan could not relax. 
Indeed, both countries continued to reinforce their troops in Manchuria even after they 
agreed to start negotiating for peace. Under the circumstances, the Japanese navy 
prepared further war; Dokdo and Ulleungdo were also subject to this plan. 
The only port that Russia had was Vladivostok, and these islands must have been 
seen to be useful for checking the probable movements of the Russian Vladivostok fleet, 
even though it was almost dismantled.  The Japanese might have taken into account the 
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possibility of the Russian navy receiving reinforcements by train, as Captain Klado and 
other Russian naval officers had urged.308 At any rate, the Japanese decided to build 
more observation posts, this time including Dokdo. 
On May 30, the Japanese General Staff made a plan to install another observation 
post at the north of Ulleungdo equipped with a radio communication system; to install an 
observation post on Dongwoigot on Korea’s east coast; to lay undersea cable linking 
Chukpyon on Korea’s east coast, Ulleungdo, Dokdo, Okinoshima and Mountain Koki in 
Japan; and to install an observation post in Dokdo.309 The plan emphasized that the 
observation post in Dokdo should be hidden from the outside and available to erect a flag 
when necessary.  
On June 12, 1905, the Japanese Ministry of Navy ordered the warship Hashidate-
maru to survey Dokdo to judge whether constructing an observation post at Dokdo would 
be feasible or not.310 On June 13, the Hashidate-maru reported that construction of an 
observation post would be possible on the peak of Dongdo (East Island). On June 24, 
1905, the Japanese Ministry of Navy ordered the construction of an observation post on 
Dokdo as well as the construction of an observation post equipped with radio 
communication on the northern side of Ulleungdo.  
On July 14, construction of the observation post on Northern Ulleungdo 
commenced; it was finished on July 25 and began operation on August 16. On July 25, 
1905, construction of the observation post on Dokdo was started; it was completed on 
August 19, 1905 and started operation on the same day. However, when the Portsmouth 
Peace Treaty was signed on September 5, 1905, and the war was formally ended on 
October 15, Japan dismantled the observation posts on Ulleungdo on October 19, and 
Dokdo on October 24.  
If the incorporation of Dokdo was for the fisherman Nakai, the Japanese 
government might have disposed or donated the observation post to him for his 
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convenience while he was catching sea lions, but the Japanese navy hurriedly destroyed it 
right after the war ended. The plan to link Chukpyon, Ulleungdo, Dokdo, Okinoshima 
and Mountain Koki was later changed. Finally, Chukpyon, Ulleungdo, Dokdo, and 
Matsue in Shimane Prefecture in Japan were linked by undersea cable on October 9, 1905, 
and this facility was maintained for the rest of the colonial period. The activities of the 
Japanese navy imply that it incorporated Dokdo for military purposes and not for the 
single fisherman’s fishing rights. 
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VI. THE END OF THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR AND DOKDO 
A. THE END OF THE POWER STRUGGLE 
After the complete annihilation of the Russian Second and Third Squadron in the 
battle of the Sea of Japan, Russia and Japan started to consider the end of the war. With 
respect to Russia, in addition to the series of defeats on land, it had lost almost all of its 
fleet in the Far East. Indeed, Russia was close to bankruptcy. Its foreign loans for the war 
amounted to $335,000,000 and its internal loans were $100,000,000.  The total cost of the 
war was nearly $1,500,000,000.311 However, the most critical reason that drove Russia to 
decide to end the war was not the financial distress, nor the difficulty in supplies. Rather, 
the domestic instability in Russia was the main cause of the tsar’s decision to abandon the 
war. To Russia, the war was no longer as popular as it was at the beginning. Even more, 
the Moroccan crisis and the spread of the Russian revolutionary movement pressed 
Nicholas to seek peace through negotiation.312  
The Japanese situation was not much better than Russia’s; it was even worse, to 
some extent. While the Japanese military had won the most important battles, Japan 
could not neglect the potential of Russia. In Manchuria and the Primorski, Russia still had 
559,000 soldiers and the number continued to increase. General Linevitch, who was 
assigned to become the commander-in-chief after Kuropatkin, was keenly waiting for the 
chance to revenge his predecessor’s defeat at the hands of the Japanese military. 
Moreover, even though Russia was in a bad situation, it was clear that Russia still had 
enough potential to wage the war with superior resources, manpower, and money.313  
Japan’s financial status had already passed the point of bankruptcy. That was why Japan 
had already been eager to end the war after the Battle of Mukden. The time had come for 
the two countries to end the war. 
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On May 31, 1905, Prime Minister Katsura instructed Takahira Kogoro, then the 
Japanese minister in Washington, to formally ask US President Theodore Roosevelt to 
act as a mediator for the “direct negotiation” between the two belligerents.314 On June 1, 
Takahira met with President Roosevelt and transmitted the request. The President 
willingly gave his consent and immediately assumed his role as a mediator. On June 8, 
1905, Roosevelt urged Russia and Japan, “not only for their own sakes, but in the interest 
of the whole civilized world, to open direct negotiations for peace with one another.”315 
After invading Sakhalin, Japan formally accepted the good offices of President Roosevelt 
and agreed to direct negotiations for peace on June 10; this was followed by Russia’s 
agreement on June 12. However, before starting negotiations, Japan and the United States 
had still more to do in order to make clear their relative interests in the Far East. 
B. TAFT-KATSURA MEMORANDUM 
On the morning of July 27th 1905, Japanese Count Katsura and the United States 
Secretary of War William Howard Taft met each other. Taft had a long confidential 
“conversation” with Katsura, as a “personal representative of President Roosevelt, not as 
a “member of the Department of State.”316 Two days later, Taft communicated a long 
telegram concerning the meeting to Secretary of State Elihu Root. Taft reported that he 
discussed mainly three topics with Katsura: Philippine, Korea, and the general peace in 
the Far East. 
First, concerning US concerns over the Philippines, Taft observed that: 
Japan's only interest in the Philippines would be, in his opinion, to have 
these Islands governed by a strong and friendly nation like the United 
States, and not to have them placed either under the misrule of the natives, 
yet unfit for self-government, or in the hands of some unfriendly European 
power. Count Katsura confirmed in the strongest terms the correctness of 
his part's views on the point and positively stated that Japan does not  
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harbor any aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines; adding that all 
the insinuations of the yellow peril type are nothing more or less than 
malicious and clumsy slanders calculated to do mischief to Japan.317 
Second, in regard to the “general peace of the extreme east,” they discussed that:   
… In his (Katsura) opinion, the best and in fact the only means for 
accomplishing the above object would be to form good understanding 
between the three governments of Japan, the United States and Great 
Britain which have common interest in upholding the principle of 
eminence [sic]…. Secretary Taft 318  said that it was difficult, indeed 
impossible, for the President of the United States of America to enter even 
to any understanding amounting in effect to a confidential informal 
agreement, without the consent of the Senate, but that he felt sure that 
without any agreement at all the people of the United States were so fully 
in accord with the policy of Japan and Great Britain in the maintenance of 
peace in the far East…319  
Third, regarding the Korean issue, the memorandum reads:  
Count Katsura observed that Korea being the direct cause of our war with 
Russia, it is a matter of absolute importance to Japan that a complete 
solution of the peninsula question should be made as the logical 
consequence of the war… Secretary Taft fully admitted the justness of the 
Count's observations and remarked to the effect that, in his personal 
opinion, the establishment by Japanese troops of a suzerainty over Korea 
to the extent of requiring that Korea enter into no foreign treaties without 
the consent of Japan was the logical result of the present war and would 
directly contribute to permanent peace in the East. His judgment was that 
the President would concur in his views in this regard, although he had no 
authority to give assurance of this…320 
After two days, Roosevelt answered Taft’s telegram: “Your conversation with 
Count Katsura absolutely correct in every respect. Wish you would state to Katsura that I 
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confirm every word you have said.”321 On August 7, 1905, Taft wrote to Katsura that 
President Roosevelt allowed him “to confirm in every respect” the statements they made 
during the conversation.”322 It might be true that the Taft-Katsura memorandum was not 
a “secret pact” or “agreement,” but “a long telegram from the secretary of war to the 
secretary of state”323 concerning an exchange of personal “opinions” between Taft and 
Katsura.324 The memorandum might have not been a quid pro quo agreement between 
Japan and the United States. But it was “at least an understanding - not quite an 
agreement, but more than a mere exchange of views.325 One more important thing: 
regardless of the binding power of the “understanding,” the understanding was kept until 
the breakout of the World War II.  
C. THE PORTSMOUTH PEACE TREATY 
On August 6, delegates from both countries - Sergei Witte and Roman Rosen for 
Russia, and Komura Jutaro and Takahira Kogoro for Japan - met at Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire in the United States. Two days later, the negotiations began. The Japanese 
cabinet set its final conditions for peace on June 30, Imperial sanction was conferred on 
July 5, and instructions for negotiation were handed to Komura the following day.326 
There were three “absolutely indispensable items,” including a Russian acknowledge of 
Japan’s complete freedom of action in Korea; the mutual withdrawal of both countries’ 
troops from Manchuria within a specified period; and that Russia would cede of its lease 
of the Liaotung Peninsula and the railway between Harbin and Port Arthur to Japan.  
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There were also four “items not absolutely indispensable but to be secured insofar as 
possible,” which would require Russia to pay a war indemnity, transfer its interned 
vessels to Japan; cede Sakhalin, and grant fishing rights to Japan.327   
The most troublesome issues, which almost caused the negotiations to break down, 
were the Japanese demands for war indemnity and Sakhalin.328 Sergei Witte’s belligerent 
and friendly attitude to the journalists transferred American public sympathies from 
Japan to Russia, so the Japanese delegates were blamed for delaying the negotiations.329 
In the end, the Peace Treaty was signed on September 5, 1905. Russia acknowledged 
Japan’s interests in Korea: 
The Imperial Russian Government, acknowledging that Japan possesses in Korea 
paramount political, military and economical interests, engages neither to obstruct nor 
interfere with measures for guidance, protection and control which the Imperial 
Government of Japan may find necessary to take in Korea….330 
The two countries agreed to evacuate from Manchuria and return its sovereignty 
to China, but Japan acquired a lease for the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur 
and Dalny, while Russia maintained its sphere of influence in northern Manchuria. Japan 
could not get indemnity, but did acquire the southern half of Sakhalin below the fiftieth 
parallel. The Japanese response to the treaty was such cold that it caused the Hibiya 
riots331 and the consequent collapse of Katsura Taro’s cabinet in January 1906. 
D. ANNEXATION OF KOREA BY JAPAN 
Japan had defeated China in the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895). Japan also had 
defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Japan and Great Britain had 
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reassured their alliance by revising their former alliance treaty on 12 August 1905, just 
before the signing of the peace treaty with Russia.332 The United States had an implicit 
alliance with Japan, having stated its support for Japan with regard to other western 
powers before the war; had consensus concerning the spheres of influence each country 
held in the Philippines and Korea; and mediated the peace treaty.  Therefore, there was 
nothing to interfere with the Japanese annexation of Korea.  
The second Korean-Japanese Agreement 333  (or the treaty of protection) was 
signed on November 18, 1905, by which Korea became the protectorate of Japan. When 
the signing of the treaty was announced, it triggered a mass demonstration by the Korean 
people in front of the palace; Korean newspapers ran editorials denouncing the treaty334 
and designating the five ministers who signed the treaty as “Ulsa Ojok (Five Bandits of 
1905).” Ito Hirobumi was appointed as the first Japanese resident general in Korea on 
December 21, 1905, and took office on March 1, 1906. Ito gave his opinion about the 
treaty to representatives of the press in Seoul: 
Now that the new treaty between Japan and Korea is concluded, it is 
believed by many Japanese even that Korea has been given to Japan, and 
this rash belief has caused bad feeling and misunderstanding between the 
two races. The most important point that I wish to impress upon you is 
that, although the new relations between Japan and Korea have now been 
definitely established by the conclusion of the protectorate treaty, the 
sovereignty of Korea remains as it was, in the hands of the Korean 
Emperor, and the imperial house of Korea and government exists as it did 
before. The new relations do but add to the welfare and dignity of the  
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Korean dynasty and the strengthening of the country. It is a great mistake 
to look upon the new treaty as a knell sounding the doom of Korea’s 
existence as a kingdom.335 
Emperor Kojong, who was forced to sign the treaty, sought one last hope by 
sending a secret letter to the leaders of nine European countries and the president of the 
United States 336  on January 29, 1906. 337  However, Roosevelt thought it would be 
“impracticable” for the US to intervene.338 Nonetheless, with desperation, Kojong sent 
his three special envoys, Yi Sang-Yol, the former vice prime minister, Yi Ui-Joing, and 
Yi-Jun, to the Second International Conference on Peace at The Hague in late June 1907.  
Yi Sang-Yol’s address to the conference moved delegates from other countries; 
they sent a telegram to Seoul to verify whether Yi Sang-Yol’s remarks represented the 
official views of the Korea government. However, the telegram was handed to Ito 
Hirobumi because telecommunication was under Japanese control. Ito pressed Kojong, 
and a message was telegraphed that the delegation was not authorized by the Korean 
government. With the British delegate’s incitement, the Korean appeal was rejected.339 
Using the incident as a pretext, Ito dethroned Kojong and announced that he would be 
succeeded by young “feeble-minded Sunjong.”340 Korea became a Japanese colony on 
the basis of the third Korean-Japanese Agreement, which was signed on July 24. Finally, 
by signing the Treaty Regarding the Annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan, Korea  
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was completely annexed to Japan, disappearing as a sovereign independent state until it 
recovered its sovereignty when Japan unconditionally surrendered at the end of World 
War II in 1945. 
E. DOKDO AFTER THE INCORPORATION BY JAPAN 
It would be natural that Japan treated Dokdo as its territory after the island was 
incorporated in 1905. It would also be natural that Dokdo be treated as Japanese territory 
after the formal annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910. But Japan did treated Dokdo as its 
territory neither after the incorporation of it, nor after the annexation of Korea. It was true 
that Dokdo was called Takeshima and placed under the administrative jurisdiction of 
Okinoshima, the Shimane Prefecture, Japan, but the Japanese regarded Takeshima as part 
of Korea. According to The Japanese Sea Lanes, which was published by the 
Hydrographic Bureau of the Ministry of the Japanese Navy in June 1907, two years after 
the incorporation of Dokdo, and which introduced the name of Takeshima (竹島, 
Liancourt rocks), it seems that the Japanese clearly recognized their sovereignty over 
Dokdo.341 However, The Korean Sea Lanes, which published in March 1907, described 
Takeshima (Dokdo) more in detail.342 Given that the Japanese incorporated Dokdo into 
their territory, they should have mentioned Dokdo only in The Japanese Sea Lanes: but 
they did not. Instead, they more precisely described Dokdo in The Korean Sea Lanes. It 
implies that the publisher of sea lanes consistently recognized Dokdo as part of Korean 
territory. Volume 6 of The Japanese Sea Lanes, which was published in 1911 after the 
annexation of Korea, mentioned in its preface that “this book recorded the sea lanes of 
the Korean coasts, but is named the Japanese Sea Lanes Vol. 6, because Korea has been 
annexed into our empire.”343 This book was republished in 1920 with the same content 
but with a different name, The Japanese Sea Lanes Vol. 10, Part I. However, when the 
                                                 
341 Dokdo was not mentioned in the chart before Japan incorporated it. Kim, The Plunder of Dokdo by 
the Japanese Military, 151-152. 
342 In fact, it was a complemented version of The Korean Sea Lanes, which was published in 1899. 
Kim, The Plunder of Dokdo by the Japanese Military, 153-156; Sang-Tae Lee, Historical Evidence of 
Korean Sovereignty over Dokdo, 219. 
343 Kim, The Plunder of Dokdo by the Japanese Military, 165-166. 
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annexation of Korea was consolidated and the Japanese thought their empire would last 
forever, this book was renamed The Korean Coastal Sea Lanes Book I.  In this way, the 
publishers of sea lanes in the Hydrographic office of the Ministry of the Japanese Navy 
consistently recognized Dokdo as Korean territory. 
Japanese scholars also recognized Dokdo as Korean territory. For instance, New 
Geography of Korea (韓國新地理), which was published in 1908 by Dabuchi Tomohiko, 
mentioned Ulleungdo in Chapter V, Kangwon Province, stating that “the deserted island 
lying southeast 30 ri from this island (Ulleungdo) and located between Okinoshima is 
called Liancodo.”344 This book also shows that the Japanese scholars recognized Dokdo 
as an appendage of Ulleungdo, which was part of Korean territory. A textbook published 
for Korean elementary school students described Dokdo as well as Ulleungdo as part of 
Korean territory.345 A Complete Map of Shimane Prefecture (島根縣全圖), which was 
published in February 1917, included Okinoshima in a divided section but did not 
mentioned Dokdo.346 Another important map is Maps by Regions (Chizu kuiki ichiran 
zu), Part I, which was published in 1935 by the Land Survey Department of the Japanese 
Army General Staff Office.347 Based on the belief that the Japanese empire would last 
forever, the map’s lines were drawn according to the original owners of the territories, 
grouping lands into “Japan proper, Korea, Kwangtung Leased Territory (Kwangtung 
province), Taiwan, Sakhalin, the Kuriles, the Southwest Islands, the Bonin Islands 
(Ogasaware shoto) etc.”348 This map drew a line on the right side of Dokdo which 
divided “the Korean region” from “the region of Japan proper.”349 
                                                 
344 Kim, The Plunder of Dokdo by the Japanese Military, 156-157; Sang-Tae Lee, Historical Evidence 
of Korean Sovereignty over Dokdo, 220. 
345 Kim, The Plunder of Dokdo by the Japanese Military, 170-171. 
346 It was the Shimane Prefecture which announced its jurisdictional authority by incorporating Dokdo 
in 1905 under the direction of the Home Ministry. 
347 When Japan surrendered in 1945, these maps were used by the Allied Forces to define Japanese 
territory and to restore other territories, which Japan had taken from other countries, to the original owners. 




In sum, it is true that Nakai enjoyed a monopoly on catching sea lions at Dokdo 
from 1905-1914; the Japanese government, however, did not incorporate Dokdo for a 
single fisherman, but for using it for military purpose. However, after the war, the 
Japanese government did not need the island anymore, even hurrying to conceal the true 
purpose of its incorporation, and perceived Dokdo as part of Korea, as it had recognized 




This thesis has explored Korean and Japanese recognition of Dokdo before and 
after the Russo-Japanese War. Before the war - in fact, since ancient history - the Korean 
people recognized Dokdo as Korean territory. Government documents and maps from 
ancient history clearly support this. The Japanese also recognized that Dokdo belonged to 
Korea. After the Meiji Restoration, Japanese influence on Korea became more expansive, 
though Japan still recognized Dokdo as Korean territory. When faced with the gradual 
encroachment of Japan into Korean territory, and illegal Japanese activities around 
Ulleungdo and Dokdo, the Korean government abolished its long-standing “vacant island 
policy,” and restarted the process of developing Ulleungdo. Indeed, the Korean Emperor 
officially reaffirmed his nation’s sovereign right over Dokdo by promulgating Imperial 
Ordinance No. 41 in October 1900. 
The Russo-Japanese War was the result of a power struggle between Russia and 
Japan over Manchuria and Korea. More precisely, both countries had the same interests 
in Manchuria and Korea. To Japan, striving to become a modernized country, Korea was 
vital to its economic and industrial interests. Japan had tried to compromise with Russia 
over Manchuria and Korea, but Russia disregarded Japan’s concerns and continued its 
expansion to the east. Consequently, Japan’s leaders decided to secure their interests by 
military means and carefully prepared for the war while still negotiating with Russia. 
Consequently, Japan started the war before it lost its last chance to contend with Russia’s 
ever-increasing military power in the Far East. 
The Japanese navy attacked Port Arthur and Chemulpo before the formal 
declaration of war, and thereby acquired a temporary command of the sea.  As a result, 
the Japanese Army easily succeeded in occupying Korea.  Based on the subsequent 
forced agreement, Japan reduced the Russians’ influence on Korea, and used Korea as 
military base for leaping to Manchuria. The revival of Russian morale in Port Arthur was 
short-lived; the well-respected Russian Admiral Stepan O. Makarov was killed, and the 
Japanese navy seemed to consolidate its command of the sea. However, the Russian 
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cruiser squadron at Vladivostok continuously threatened Japanese communication lines. 
The Japanese Navy dispatched its Second Fleet to defeat the Russian cruiser squadron, 
but the results were not good. In May 1904, the Japanese lost one third of their capital 
ships in a day and lost a series of other ships. Finally, the Japanese Navy started 
constructing observation posts along the Korean coastline to offset its weakened naval 
power and the Russian cruisers’ threat by tracking the enemy’s movements. 
Meanwhile, a Japanese fisherman went to Tokyo to get a monopoly on fishing 
rights at Dokdo from the Korean government via the Japanese government. However, 
Japanese officials incited the fisherman to petition for incorporation of Dokdo instead.  
The Japanese government, although it knew well that Dokdo was Korean territory, 
secretly processed the incorporation. At the same time, the Japanese army enjoyed a 
series of victories in Manchuria. The Japanese army succeeded in isolating Port Arthur, 
and continuously pressed the Russians to the north. Meanwhile, the tsar had decided to 
send reinforcements to the east, but the Second Fleet did not weigh anchor until the First 
Squadron had disintegrated in the east. By the end of 1904, the Japanese advanced to 
Liaoyang, but started to suffer from the shortage of money and manpower. 
The fall of Port Arthur opened a new chapter of the war. The Japanese Navy 
could return to home and prepare for its last decisive battle with the Russian Second 
Squadron. At the same time, the Japanese government quickly and secretly incorporated 
Dokdo into its territory. The Japanese Army now could concentrate its forces to attack 
Mukden, though its victory was quite costly to both belligerents. After the Battle of 
Mukden, the Japanese wanted to end the war, but the Russians did not want to end it with 
dishonor. In the end, the conclusion of the war would result from the last battle of the two 
navies, i.e., the Battle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan. The tsar’s last armada, the Second 
Squadron, suffered from its legendary voyage from Europe to the Far East, having 
travelled almost halfway around the globe via Africa’s Cape of Good Hope. Furthermore, 
it had to waste time waiting for the Third Squadron, while the Japanese Combined fleet 
became more confident before the upcoming battle. 
The Battle of the East Sea/Sea of Japan consequently compelled the end of the 
war.  While the Japanese wanted to end the war mainly because of a shortage of 
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resources, the growing revolutionary movement in Russia drove the tsar’s inclination to 
end the war. However, expecting a prolonged war, the two belligerents continued to build 
up reinforcements even after having agreed to negotiate for peace. Before starting the 
negotiations, the United States and Japan exchanged each country’s interest in the 
Philippines and Korea through the Taft-Katsura memorandum thereby acknowledging the 
Japanese influence on Korea. The Japanese navy recognized the strategic importance of 
Ulleungdo and Dokdo, constructing additional observation posts on the former and one 
on the latter. However, when the war formally ended, the Japanese hurriedly dismantled 
them all, by which it clearly showed that the incorporation of Dokdo was for military 
purposes, and not for the benefit of a lone fisherman. 
After the formal annexation of Korea in 1910, the Japanese treated Dokdo as part 
of Korean territory, just as they had done before the war. The Japanese documents related 
to hydrographs, geography, and textbooks clearly showed that Japan recognized Dokdo 
as Korean territory.  
As was discussed at the beginning of this thesis, the Dokdo issue is not so much 
an economic issue as it is a historical one. This historical survey should be helpful in 
clarifying the context of the main issues related to the Korean-Japanese territorial 
disputes. It is hoped that the readers of this thesis will see the dispute from a historical 
point of view, not from the political or economic ones, because it is the history of Dokdo 
that will allow this issue to be resolved. Korean and Japanese who are concerned about 
how the Dokdo issue may influence Korea-Japan relations in the future, and the 
consequences for all of East Asia, should focus on an accurate view on Dokdo’s history 
as presented in this thesis. Resolving the dispute may, in fact, be the first step by which 
Korea and Japan can develop a true partnership and friendship while clearing away the 
century-old bad feelings between the two countries. In this regard, the territorial dispute 
between Korea and Japan over Dokdo/Takeshima present not only a challenge, but also 
an opportunity for both countries, and the major powers with a stake in Korea-Japan 
harmony in the 21st century—the United States, the Republic of China, and Russia. 
All of these countries should be guided by: “Then you will know the truth, and the 
truth will set you free” (John, 8:32). 
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